The SEC’s Neglected Weapon: A Proposed Amendment to Section 17(a)(3) and the Application of Negligent Insider Trading by Steinberg, Marc I. & Ramirez, Abel, Jr.
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 3 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 3 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/17 5:06 PM
239
THE SEC’S NEGLECTED WEAPON: A PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO SECTION 17(A)(3) AND THE 
APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENT INSIDER TRADING
Marc I. Steinberg* & Abel Ramirez, Jr.** 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 240
I. OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING ............................................... 246
A. The Classical “Special Relationship” Theory ................. 248
B. The Misappropriation Theory ......................................... 252
C. Tipping ............................................................................ 255
II. AN UNTAPPED REMEDY — SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT ........................................................................................ 258
A. Overview ......................................................................... 258
B. Differences Between Section 10(b) and Section 17(a) ... 262
C. Proposed Amendment ..................................................... 263
D. The Proposed Amendment Will Not Lead to Vexatious 
Litigation ......................................................................... 267
III. NEGLIGENT INSIDER TRADING UNDER SECTION 17(A)(3) ...... 268
A. “Possession” v. “Awareness” in the Context of Negligent 
Insider Trading ................................................................ 271
B. The Misappropriation Theory and the Language of Section 
17(a)(3) ........................................................................... 273
C. The Effect of the Proposed Amendment ........................ 275
D. Insider Trading Cases Based on Negligence That the SEC 
May Have Successfully Pursued Under the Proposed 
Amendment of Section 17(a)(3) ..................................... 276
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 283
* Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman 
School of Law. 
** Private Equity Compliance Counsel. 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 3 S
ide B
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 3 Side B      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/17 5:06 PM
240 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol.19:2 
INTRODUCTION
As the key enforcement provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Section 10(b)1 and the corresponding Rule 10b-52 are widely 
considered to be the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) foremost 
tools in policing insider trading.3  As a result of the authority granted by these 
provisions, the SEC has relied heavily on Section 10(b) and its corresponding 
rules when pursuing insider trading claims.4  While these provisions are 
standard in prosecuting insider trading enforcement actions, the standard of 
 1.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2016).  Section 10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange – 
. . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or 
any securities-based swap agreement[] any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors. 
 2.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2016).  Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 3.  See generally MARC I. STEINBERG & WILLIAM WANG, INSIDER TRADING (3d ed. 2010) 
(reviewing heightened SEC scrutiny of insider trading). 
 4.  See Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016) (affirming conviction of tippee of 
material nonpublic information under Section 10(b) adhering to its holding in Dirks); United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that a conviction under Section 10(b) can 
be upheld under a misappropriation theory); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (finding 
that a tippee was not in violation of Section 10(b) because he had no duty that would have 
required him to disclose the information he used to trade); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222 (1980) (reversing conviction under Section 10(b) because alleged violator was not a 
corporate insider and, under the charges set forth, did not have a duty to disclose prior to 
trading); see also Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2016) (prohibiting transactions in 
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information in connection with a tender offer). 
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culpability that the SEC must prove to successfully prosecute an insider 
trading claim under these provisions is quite demanding.5  In view of several 
losses in recent insider trading enforcement actions,6 the SEC, when 
appropriate, should consider bringing these actions under a different statute 
than Section 10(b) — one that requires proof of a lesser standard of 
culpability.
In order to successfully establish a claim under Section 10(b) (as well 
as Rule 14e-3),7 the plaintiff must prove (among other elements) that the 
 5.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (concluding that 
“manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance” in § 10(b) “connote[] intentional or willful 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors”); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27 
(“[T]o constitute a violation of Rule 10b–5, there must be fraud”); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–
35 (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be 
fraud.”).
 6.  See, e.g., SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing a grant of summary 
judgment for the SEC because a material issue of fact existed as to whether the materiality 
and scienter requirements were met); SEC v. Moshayedi, Civil Action No. 12-cv-01179 (C.D. 
Cal. Jun. 6, 2014) (finding for defendant on all claims made by the SEC); SEC v. Yang, Case 
No. 12-cv-02473 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2014) (finding in favor of defendants on insider trading 
claims); SEC v. Steffes, Case No. 1:10-cv-06266 (N.D. Ill. Jan 27, 2014) (finding defendants 
not guilty of insider trading when the SEC’s evidence was merely inferential); SEC v. 
Schvacho, Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-0022557 (N.D. Ga. Jan 7, 2014) (finding that there was 
not enough evidence to prove that Schvacho misappropriated insider information and that he 
had obtained material, nonpublic information when overhearing telephone calls); SEC v. 
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 
2010) (finding for defendant on insider trading claims); John Carreyrou, Mark Cuban Cleared 
in Insider-Trading Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2013) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303680404579139774081561730 
[https://perma.cc/KAW9-XS9H]; see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 
2014) (reversing and vacating criminal conviction based on unlawful tipping and trading). 
 7.  Under the enabling provision of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, the SEC adopted 
Rule 14e-3 in order to establish the “disclose or abstain from trading rule” in regard to tender 
offers.  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In this limited context, 
the proscriptions against trading and tipping on material confidential information are far more 
onerous than under Section 10(b): Rule 14e-3 applies this disclose-or-abstain provision when 
a defendant possesses material and nonpublic information that relates to a tender offer where 
the person knows or has reason to know the information is nonpublic and was received 
directly or indirectly from the offeror, the subject corporation, any of their affiliated persons, 
or any person acting on behalf of either company.  Rule 14e-3(a), (d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
3(a), (d).  Moreover, the rule contains a broad anti-tipping provision.  Under Rule 14e-3, a 
person who knows or has reason to know “that she is in possession of material nonpublic 
information regarding a tender offer directly or indirectly from the” offeror (bidder), target 
corporation, or an intermediary can neither trade nor tip the securities of the respective 
company prior to adequate public disclosure (and absorption) of such information into the 
public securities markets.  Id. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 645 (upholding Rule 14e-3 as a 
“proper exercise of the SEC’s prophylactic power under §14(e)” and finding that these 
provisions applied to O’Hagan in addition to Section 10(b) charges).  In addition, a tippee of 
material and nonpublic information related to a tender offer who knows, or has reason to 
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defendant acted with “scienter”8 as the requisite mens rea.9  In the context of 
insider trading, this means that, in order for liability to attach, the SEC must 
establish that an insider was aware of material and nonpublic information at 
the time that the insider traded.10  Further, one who knowingly conveys such 
information to others in breach of one’s fiduciary duty is also deemed to have 
the requisite scienter.11
Currently, a void exists in the spectrum of liability for insider trading 
causes of action.  In other words, when the SEC pursues a cause of action 
against a defendant purchaser under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for an 
insider trading violation, there are only two possible outcomes – liability for 
intentional insider trading (i.e., a court holds that the defendant committed 
insider trading by acting with scienter), or a complete lack of liability (i.e., a 
court rules that the defendant did not commit intentional insider trading).  In 
contrast to various offenses that typically maintain varying levels of liability 
know, that the subject information has come directly or indirectly from an offeror, target 
corporation, or intermediary similarly cannot trade or tip on the stock of the respective 
company prior to adequate public disclosure (and absorption) of this information into the 
public securities markets.  § 240.14e-3(a), (d).  Because of the narrow scope of Rule 14e-3, 
as applying only in the tender offer context, insider trading proceedings have been primarily 
pursued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (“Section 10(b) 
was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.”); see also Rule 10b5-2, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2016) (defining the situations in which the misappropriation theory 
applies to charges under Rule 10b-5); see generally A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities
Fraud & Commodities Fraud (2012) (surveying the extensive, diverse use of Rule 10b-5).  
“Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business 
relationships.  This rule provides that a person receiving confidential information under 
circumstances specified in the rule would owe a duty of trust or confidence and thus could be 
liable under the misappropriation theory.”  SEC, Fast Answers: Insider Trading (Jan. 15, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm [https://perma.cc/7P4L-CBFD]; STEINBERG
& WANG, supra note 3, at § 5.4.3. 
 8.  Scienter is defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”  Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 
193 n.12). 
 9.   See, e.g., id. at 680.
 10.  See generally Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2016) (“Rule 10b5-1 provides 
that a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic information if a trader is ‘aware’ of the 
material nonpublic information when making the purchase or sale.”).  Fast Answers: Insider 
Trading, supra note 7; STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, at § 4.4.5. 
 11.  See Salman, 137 S.Ct. 420 (applying rationale of Dirks); Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 
(holding that the duty of tippees to disclose or abstain from trading depends on whether the 
tipper has herself breached a fiduciary duty); U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d. Cir. 1981) 
(upholding an indictment on the grounds that the defendants had allegedly misappropriated 
material and nonpublic information entrusted to them by their employers and clients); 
Newman, 773 F.3d at 446 (“The elements of tipping liability are the same, regardless of 
whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the ‘misappropriation’ theory.”) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (reversing conviction of 
Chiarella because he did not have a duty to disclose). 
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enumerated by statute, the only potential outcomes for insider trading 
liability in the purchaser context are on opposite sides of the liability 
spectrum, thus creating a gap that allows “grey-area” inside traders to avoid 
liability.12  Therefore, when pursuing insider trading against purchasers 
under Section 10(b), the SEC faces the challenging requirement of proving 
the defendant’s intentional or knowing misconduct.13
The SEC’s task of proving liability would be significantly lessened (and 
presumably more successful) if it could pursue insider trading claims that 
require proof of a lesser mental state, namely, that of negligence.  Indeed, 
there is such a provision that grants the SEC with this power: Section 
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933.14  Unlike claims of insider trading 
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which require the SEC to prove 
scienter,15 insider trading may be pursued by the Commission under Section 
17(a)(3) based upon negligence.16  To date, the SEC occasionally has 
invoked this provision against negligent sellers who allegedly have engaged 
in illegal insider trading.17
Although Section 17(a) is not an unheard of statute to invoke in insider 
trading proceedings (as well as with respect to other alleged misconduct 
involving securities18), it has been primarily used as a supplement to, and in 
 12.  See supra note 6. 
 13.  “The words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction with ‘device or 
contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
misconduct.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
 14.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3)(2016).  Section 17(a)(3) provides:  
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the 
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
 15.  See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691 (“Rule 10b–5 must . . . be restricted to conduct involving 
scienter.”).
 16.  See id. at 697 (noting that § 17(a)(3) “focuses upon the effect of particular conduct 
on members of the investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person 
responsible”).  In criminal cases (even for Section 17(a)(3)), intent must be shown. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff (punishing knowing and willful conduct). 
 17.  See, e.g., Bolan, Exchange Act Release No. 75066, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2201 (May 28, 
2015) at n.2. (“Scienter is not required to prove a violation of Section 17(a)(3). Instead, a 
violation of this section may be established by showing negligent conduct.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 18.  See SEC v. Lyon, 529 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that SEC sufficiently 
pled claim that investors violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act by purchasing private 
investments in public equities (PIPE) securities, then taking short sale positions in PIPE 
issuers’ publicly traded stock, where SEC alleged that investors agreed to be bound by 
confidentiality clauses contained in documents they received in connection with PIPE 
offerings).
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conjunction with, Rule 10b-5 as an additional cause of action to prosecute 
“scheme” liability.19  For the most part, these enforcement actions invoked 
Section 17(a)(1) which, like Rule 10b-5, requires that scienter be proven.20
Thus, a specific definition of negligence in the context of insider trading has 
received scant attention.21
Section 17(a)(3) has been widely neglected as a weapon in the SEC’s 
arsenal against insider trading.  Section 17(a)(3) carries the potential of 
providing the SEC with an advantage that is not afforded by Section 10(b), 
Rule 10b-5, or Rule 14e-3 — the authority to prosecute insider trading claims 
premised on the lesser mental state of negligence (namely, that a defendant 
should have known that her acts would be used to perpetrate an insider 
trading violation, a substantially lighter burden than the scienter requirement 
of Rule 10b-5).  Thus, Section 17(a)(3) would cast a wider net to enforce 
insider trading regulations against a new category of defendants: negligent 
inside traders as well as negligent tippers and tippees.22  However, despite 
the power granted under Section 17(a)(3) to pursue negligent insider trading 
claims, the elements of such a cause of action have yet to be sufficiently 
formulated.  Further, the current language of Section 17(a)(3) limits the 
power of such a cause of action to only negligent (or more culpable) inside 
traders that offer or sell23 securities in a transaction that ultimately results in 
a fraud “upon the purchaser,”24 thereby ensnaring a substantially smaller 
 19.  See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The SEC has also used 
its full panoply of powers to police insider trading through enforcement actions and civil 
actions.  The agency has relied . . . on Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. . .”); SEC v. Kirch, 263 
F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“It has long been established that ‘insider trading’ in 
the literal and classic sense—trading in a corporation’s stock by a corporate insider on the 
basis of material nonpublic information—violates Securities Act § 17(a) . . .”); see also, U.S. 
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (involving a fraudulent short sale of securities under 
§ 17(a)(1)); Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act After Naftalin and 
Redington, 68 GEO L.J. 163 (1979) (discussing the use of Section 17(a) to prosecute schemes 
instead of Section 10(b)). 
 20.  See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697 (holding that Section 17(a)(3) “quite plainly focuses upon 
the effect of particular conduct on members of the investing public, rather than upon the 
culpability of the person responsible”). 
 21.  See generally U.S. v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007) (suggesting, in dicta, that 
tippee liability can exist where the tip is merely a “careless” passing on of information: 
“Unlike Dirks, Gianamore was not a whistleblower. Instead, he was an insider acting either 
carelessly or negligently by giving his friend material insider information that the friend then 
traded on.”). 
 22.  See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697 (“[T]he language of § 17(a) requires scienter under 
§ 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3).”). 
 23.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
 24.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3); see also Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (holding that Section 17(a) 
applies to frauds against brokers and investors). 
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segment of insider trading defendants.25
A literal interpretation of Section 17(a)(3)’s language limits the 
government’s ability to bring a claim of insider trading under this statute to 
one scenario – the one in which a defendant offers or sells securities to a 
purchaser who is unaware that the seller/defendant is privy to material, 
nonpublic information that would typically be considered “bad news” (e.g., 
a subject company’s losses that have yet to be publicly announced).  
Therefore, based on the statute’s language, requiring an act which operates 
as a fraud “upon the purchaser,” Section 17(a)(3) does not provide authority 
to the government to bring a claim of insider trading where the subject 
defendant is “the purchaser” (namely, the scenario in which the insider 
purchases her company’s stock while being privy to material, nonpublic 
information that would typically be considered “good news” such as 
impressive profits that have yet to be publicly announced).  As a result of 
this limitation in the text of the statute, the SEC is granted authority to 
prosecute only a fraction of negligent insider trading violations – those in 
which the defendant was the alleged seller (or offeror to sell). 
Why does there exist an inequality of potential defendants that are 
susceptible to causes of action for negligent insider trading under the 
language of Section 17(a)(3)?  With such a potentially powerful weapon at 
its disposal, the SEC would be significantly more empowered if it were 
granted the authority to prosecute a full spectrum of insider trading 
violations, including those that currently reside in the void between “no 
violation” and “intentional violation” (when pursued under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5).  In the SEC’s continuing “war” on insider trading,26 a 
broader application of Section 17(a)(3) to include purchasers in addition to 
sellers, as well as including a concise definition of negligent insider trading, 
would enable the SEC to more vigilantly combat insider trading. 
The objective of this article is to propose a method that will allow 
regulators to bridge the gap that currently exists in the context of insider 
trading liability.  In order to accomplish this task, this article will: 1) discuss 
the potential untapped resource of Section 17(a)(3) with respect to SEC 
 25.  The typical scenario in which an inside trader sells securities is when the insider 
attempts to avoid losses on securities that are already owned. When the inside trader is aware 
of material and nonpublic information at the time of the trade, a fraud has resulted “upon the 
purchaser” (Section 17(a)(3)).  However, the most common insider trading causes of action 
regard the inside trader who purchases securities in an attempt to profit based on material and 
nonpublic information.  Thus, the fraud that results is upon the seller.
 26.  See DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991) (providing a 
historical account of the SEC’s “war” on insider trading); see also STEINBERG & WANG, supra
note 3, at § 7.3; Peter J. Henning, S.E.C.’s Losing Streak in Court Puts Agency in Spotlight,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014) (discussing the SEC’s current losing streak and the difficulties in 
its attempts at enforcing insider trading). 
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enforcement of insider trading abuse; 2) discuss the theoretical concept of 
negligent insider trading; and 3) suggest a solution to remedy this disparate 
treatment – a legislative amendment to Section 17(a)(3) that would broaden 
the scope of this statute to apply to both sellers and purchasers. 
This article also suggests an interpretation of the proposed statute that 
would enable the SEC to pursue negligent misconduct in the context of 
insider trading committed by those who improperly use material and 
nonpublic information (without having to establish the Rule 10b-5 scienter 
element).  Further, the word “indirectly,” as it is used in the introductory 
paragraph of Section 17(a), may be construed to alter the scope and 
application of the statute by broadening the range of misconduct that would 
be subject to prosecution under this provision.  If interpreted as developed 
herein, the effect of this term would allow the SEC to pursue insider trading 
violations based on negligence against those who improperly use material 
and nonpublic information or who misappropriate such information. 
In order to address the rationale behind the proposed legislative 
amendment, and thereby focus on the amended Section 17(a)(3) as a 
potential weapon in the SEC’s arsenal, it is necessary to discuss the history 
and evolution of judicial interpretation of the specific language within the 
current statute.  Thereafter, a proposed interpretation of the statute’s yet-to-
be-amended language as applied in the context of insider trading will be 
provided.  Finally, the article will discuss several insider trading cases, in 
which the SEC incurred losses under Rule 10b-5, but may have tasted victory 
under the yet-to-be amended Section 17(a)(3). 
I. OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING
Based on Supreme Court precedent, insider trading is defined as 
purchasing or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar 
relationship of trust and confidence, while aware of material, nonpublic 
information regarding the subject corporation or the market for its 
securities.27  The unlawfulness of insider trading is premised on the notion 
that insider trading is a type of securities fraud28 based on the inherent 
unfairness that results when fiduciaries and other specific persons,29 who are 
 27.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230; O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647. 
 28.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30. 
 29.  Early case law, in which the SEC pursued claims of insider trading under Section 
10(b), was primarily focused on the most basic of insider trading situations – direct sales or 
purchases, by a defendant company’s directors or its officers, of securities issued by that same 
company, where the defendant willfully failed to disclose material nonpublic information 
about the company’s affairs, when such information affected the value of those securities.  
See, e.g., In re Ward La France Truck Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 3445 (Jun. 10, 1943); 
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aware of material and nonpublic information, reap profits or avoid losses to 
the detriment of investors who trade securities without being privy to such 
information.30  Insider trading involves a transaction in which someone 
“deceives” by omission when there exists a duty to disclose.31  The 
“omission” in an insider trading transaction occurs when a party engages in 
a securities transaction while being aware of material and nonpublic 
information (e.g., information that would likely impact the price of the 
security and result in either a profit or an avoidance of loss), and that party 
fails to adequately disclose such information.32  This breach of duty to 
Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F.Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).  Subsequent case law has 
expanded the scope of Section 10(b)’s application to claims of insider trading while 
simultaneously refining the legal theories upon which a claim for insider trading may be 
premised.
 Although the elements of an insider trading violation under Section 10(b) are not 
legislatively enumerated, three Supreme Court rulings have established definitive elements: 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) and 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  Essentially, proscribed insider trading occurs 
under Section 10(b) when a defendant: (1) is aware of material and nonpublic information 
regarding a company or its securities, and (2) is bound by a fiduciary duty (or similar 
relationship of trust or confidence), (3) to either that company’s shareholders or to the source 
of the information, and (4) purchases or sells (or engages in tipping of) the company’s 
securities prior to that information being disseminated and absorbed by the investing public.  
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision, United States v. Salman, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016), 
adheres to its holding in Dirks.
30.
[T]he Commission defined the category of ‘insiders’ subject to a disclose-or-
abstain obligation according to two factors: “[F]irst, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and not for the personal benefit of anyone, 
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of 
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 249 (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote 
omitted)).
 31.  An omission is misleading if it creates “an impression of a state of facts that differs 
in a material way from the one that actually exists.”  Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280 
F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002); see also New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank 
of Scotland Group, PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 126 (2d. Cir. 2013) (finding “[a] reasonable investor 
can independently analyze how a security will perform in the market, but she cannot 
compensate for the fact that she has not received what she was told to expect”); Dodona I, 
LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding 
“[u]ltimately, an incomplete or misleading disclosure may be just as damaging as total 
concealment”); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 944 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
“incomplete disclosures, or ‘half-truths,’ implicate a duty to disclose whatever additional 
information is necessary to rectify the misleading statements”). 
 32.  Materiality is determined based upon whether there is a “substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”  Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
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disclose has resulted in two principal bases of Section 10(b) liability: the 
classical “special relationship” theory and the misappropriation theory.33
A. The Classical “Special Relationship” Theory 
The classical “special relationship” theory of insider trading “holds that 
a corporate insider (such as an officer or director) violates Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 by trading on the corporation’s securities on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information about the corporation.”34  Under the classical “special 
relationship” theory of insider trading under Section 10(b), a fiduciary duty 
exists between a company’s shareholders and corporate insiders (e.g., 
directors and officers).35  This fiduciary duty gives rise “to a duty to disclose 
or abstain from trading because of the necessity of preventing a corporate 
insider from taking advantage of uninformed stockholders.”36  Thus, the 
fraudulent act in a classical “special relationship” insider trading transaction 
is premised on a fraudulent omission by a corporate insider when she sells 
her subject company’s stock to (or purchases from) her subject company’s 
shareholders in breach of the duty owed.  The Supreme Court has embraced 
the classical “special relationship” theory under Rule 10b-5.37  Under this 
438, 449 (1976)).  Information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
purchaser or seller of a security (1) would consider the fact important in deciding whether to 
buy or sell the security or (2) a substantial likelihood existed that a reasonable investor would 
have viewed the total mix of information made available to be significantly altered by 
disclosure of the fact.”  Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 683 (4th Cir. 1999); see
also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (finding that in order 
to satisfy the materiality requirement, there must be “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”); Dunn v. Borta, 369 F.3d 
421, 427 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the reasonable investor standard requires “a showing 
of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have 
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable [investor]”); SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969) (holding that “[b]efore insiders may act upon material information, such information 
must have been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the 
investing public”). 
 33.  SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 
408-09 (7th Cir. 1991); STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, at §§ 5.2-5.4. 
 34.  Newman, 773 F.3d at 445. 
 35.  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
 36.  Newman, 773 F.3d at 446 (finding “[t]he elements of tipping liability are the same, 
regardless of whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the ‘misappropriation’ 
theory”) (internal citations omitted). 
 37.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.  In regard to insider status, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dirks, despite its restrictive holding, adopted the principle of the “quasi-insider.”  This 
approach focuses on those persons who may constructively be considered an “insider” with a 
fiduciary duty to disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading.  The Court 
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theory, the counterparty to the transaction is the victim of the deception 
because, by engaging in this transaction, the counterparty has been deceived 
into believing that the insider does not have information “known to [her] by 
virtue of [her] position” that, if known to the shareholder, “would affect [his] 
investment judgment.”38
Hence, a fundamental principle, recognized at least since the SEC’s 
decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co over fifty years ago, is that an “insider” 
and, in certain circumstances, the insider’s “tippee” must either: (1) disclose 
the material and nonpublic information that is in his possession prior to 
trading; or (2) abstain from trading altogether.39  The holding in Cady (in 
which the SEC alleged liability under Section 17(a) along with Section 
10(b)), and later refined in Chiarella, established the classical “special 
relationship” theory of insider trading.40  Generally, the classical theory 
focuses on trading by corporate fiduciaries in the securities of their own 
corporations.41  Under this approach, a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he 
is an insider of a corporation, and, in breach of his fiduciary duty owed to 
expounded this principle by stating: 
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed 
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the 
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for 
recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic 
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential 
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes. . . . [W]hen such a person breaches his 
fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. . . . For 
such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the 
disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply 
such a duty. 
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 677 n.14 (internal citations omitted).  Hence, the Court declined to confine 
the classical insider trading proscription to directors and officers of the company.  Rather, 
under the Court’s rationale, “individuals enjoying a special relationship with the corporation, 
such as accountants, attorneys, consultants, and underwriters, may be viewed as insiders when 
they trade on material nonpublic information that they legitimately received during the course 
of that relationship.”  MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAWS 387-88 (6th ed. 
2014).
 38.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; see also STEINBERG, supra note 37.
 39. 40 SEC at 911. 
 40. 445 U.S. at 227. 
 41.  See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (concerning an officer of a broker-dealer specializing in 
providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors who 
was charged with aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 
10b-5 for providing material nonpublic information about an insurance company to clients 
and investors, who relied on such information in selling their holdings thereof); see also SEC 
v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cherif, 933 F.2d at 408) (“Under the 
classical theory, a person violates [Rule 10b-5] when he or she buys or sells securities on the 
basis of material, non-public information and at the same time is an insider of the corporation 
whose securities are traded.”). 
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the corporation and its shareholders, buys or sells securities of that 
corporation while being aware of material and nonpublic information.42  In 
other words, the classical “special relationship” theory only imposes liability 
when an inside trader is a corporate insider (e.g., director, control person, or 
officer) or a temporary insider of the company (e.g., investment banker or 
legal counsel) whose securities the insider has traded.  Under this theory, 
such an inside trader breaches a fiduciary duty owed to the company’s 
shareholders.  Thus, in Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that liability for trading based on material nonpublic information 
arises under Section 10(b) if there exists a “duty to disclose arising from a 
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”43
1. Insider is the Purchaser (“Good News” Scenario) 
When an insider commits an insider trading offense by purchasing 
stock, the typical scenario that occurs under the classical “special 
relationship” theory of insider trading is the “good news” scenario – the 
insider becomes aware of material and nonpublic information that is 
expected to cause the price of the stock to increase in value (i.e., bullish 
information) and then purchases securities with the intent of profiting from 
the increase in the securities’ value.  Information that is typically “good 
news” includes higher profits, launch of a new product, receipt of a lucrative 
contract, or a profitable acquisition or disposition.  As the more recognized, 
and more commonly prosecuted scenario of insider trading violations, Rule 
10b-5 is invoked when the corporate insider purchases a subject company’s 
securities without disclosing the favorable inside information about the 
company’s affairs to the investing public as well as to the party selling the 
subject securities. 
2. Insider is the Seller (“Bad News” Scenario) 
When an insider commits an insider trading offense by selling stock, 
the typical scenario that occurs under the classical “special relationship” 
theory of insider trading is the “bad news” scenario — the insider becomes 
aware of material and non-public information that is expected to cause the 
price of the stock to decrease in value (i.e., bearish information) and sells 
securities in order to avoid a loss from the decrease in the securities’ value.  
 42.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1, supra note 10. 
 43.  Chiarella, 445 U.S at 230; see also id. at 235 (rejecting the equal access rationale 
and holding that “[A] duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession 
of nonpublic market information”). 
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Information that is typically “bad news” includes lower profits, increased 
debt, loss of a major contract, or a government enforcement action.44  As the 
 44.  Two relatively recent insider trading cases that involve both buys (“Good News” 
Scenario) and sales (“Bad News” Scenario) are the cases involving the hedge fund, Galleon 
Management.  The civil case, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP (683 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
9, 2010)), and the corresponding criminal case against Galleon founder, Raj Rajaratnam, U.S. 
v. Rajaratnam, (802 F.Supp.2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2011)), involved an insider trading 
scheme estimated to have generated approximately $45 million in both profits and savings.  
Among several other various stocks traded (both long and short), Rajaratnam was convicted 
of insider trading for short selling the stock of the microprocessor manufacturing company, 
Intel, based on material and nonpublic information.
In both cases, Rajaratnam, was found to have received material nonpublic 
information from his personal friend, Rajiv Goel.  Goel was a managing director with Intel’s 
treasury group – Intel Capital, which made proprietary equity investments in various 
technology companies.  In one particular instance, Goel spoke to Rajaratnam and told him to 
short sell Intel stock because, based on Goel’s personal knowledge of the company’s financial 
status, he was aware that Intel’s earnings would be below expectations.  In return, Goel asked 
that Rajaratnam place similar trades in Goel’s personal brokerage account (to which 
Rajaratnam was an authorized manager) in order to falsely suggest that the trades in the 
account were not placed directly by Goel (which would have been a violation of Goel’s 
fiduciary duty owed to Intel). 
 On April 9, 2007, one week before Intel’s scheduled Ql 2007 earnings 
announcement, Rajaratnam and Galleon sold short 1,000,000 shares of Intel stock at $20.14 
per share.  Rajaratnam also fulfilled the requested trades in Goel’s personal brokerage 
account.  When Intel ultimately released its Q1 2007 earnings, Rajaratnam and Galleon 
profited from the trades in the amount of $1.3 million, and avoided losses in the amount of 
$917,000.
The court found the subject of the confidential information discussed between 
Rajaratnam and Goel to be “material.”  Rajaratnam, 802 F.Supp.2d 491.  The court also found 
that Goel, a corporate insider based on his employment position with Intel, had violated his 
fiduciary duty to his employer by communicating the information to Rajaratnam.  Id.  As a 
result, both Rajaratnam and Goel were held to have violated Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of 
trading based on material nonpublic information. Id.
While possessing or even sometimes trading based on material nonpublic 
information is not necessarily a violation of the law, the court described how Rule 10b-5 was 
violated in this instance by both: (1) the trader and (2) the tipper. 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the 
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.  
Trading on such information qualifies as a ‘deceptive device’ under § 10(b) . . . 
because a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders 
of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information 
by reason of their position with that corporation.  The ambit of Rule 10b–5’s 
prohibition on insider trading extends beyond the insiders who themselves have 
a fiduciary duty but also to the ‘tippee’ recipients of insider information from 
those who are insiders. An individual is liable as a tippee under Rule 10b–5 if: 
(1) the tippee received material nonpublic information regarding a publicly traded 
company from a tipper; (2) the tippee traded securities while in possession of the 
information; (3) the tippee knew that the tipper had violated a fiduciary duty when 
the information was provided; and (4) the tippee benefitted from the disclosure 
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less recognized, and less commonly prosecuted scenario of insider trading 
violations, Rule 10b-5 is invoked when the corporate insider sells a subject 
company’s securities without disclosing the unfavorable inside information 
about the company’s affairs to the investing public as well as to the party 
purchasing the subject securities.45  Under the language of Section 17(a)(3), 
liability for negligent insider trading is limited to only this less-common 
scenario.46
B. The Misappropriation Theory 
An alternative theory of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) is 
the “misappropriation theory,” which extends liability to certain “outsiders” 
who do not have a fiduciary relationship to the subject company or its 
shareholders.47  Liability under the misappropriation theory attaches where 
such an “outsider” (such as an attorney or investment banker) obtains 
material and nonpublic information about the company and subsequently 
breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of that information by using the 
information for personal gain — either directly, by trading based on the 
information, or indirectly, by passing the information on to others.48  In other 
words, such conduct rises to the level of fraudulent insider trading because 
the misappropriator’s conduct is deceptive by feigning “loyalty to the 
of the information.
Id., at 497-98 (internal quotations removed). 
 45.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5. 
 46.  Section 17(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the 
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading; or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (emphasis added). 
 47.  Newman, 773 F.3d at 445-46. 
 48.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (“The ‘misappropriation theory’ holds that a person 
commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, 
in breach of a duty owed to the source of information.”); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 
(explaining that a fraud may also be committed when the person possessing the confidential 
information does not, herself, trade based on the information, but rather provides the 
information as a gift to “a trading relative or friend”). 
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principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal 
gain.”49
In contrast to the classical “special relationship” theory, the 
misappropriation theory extends liability to a trader who is not a corporate 
insider (as under the classical “special relationship” theory).  When an inside 
trader does not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company 
whose stock is traded and he/she has not obtained the information from one 
who has breached such a duty, there can be no insider trading liability under 
the classical “special relationship” theory.50  However, in such 
circumstances, liability may still be premised on the “misappropriation” 
theory of insider trading.  Under this theory, liability is based on deception 
of the source of the information, rather than on deception of the shareholders 
(as with the classical “special relationship” theory).51
Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, the inside 
trader does not owe a duty to disclose to the counterparty of the insider 
trading transaction but, rather, to the source of the information.  Rather than 
premising liability on the direct fiduciary relationship between a company’s 
shareholders and typical insiders (as would occur under the classical “special 
relationship theory”), the misappropriation theory premises liability “on a 
fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access 
to confidential information.”52  In other words, the inside trader’s 
improperly-motivated, undisclosed, and self-serving use of a subject 
company’s material inside information, in breach of a duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality to the source of the information, constitutes deceptive 
conduct under Section 10(b) when it is used to purchase or sell securities.53
The Supreme Court gave its approbation to the misappropriation theory 
in United States v. O’Hagan.54  In this case, the defendant, James O’Hagan, 
was a partner of a national law firm that represented the bidding company, 
Grand Metropolitan PLC, in a contemplated tender offer of Pillsbury 
Company common stock.55  O’Hagan was not personally involved in the 
 49.  SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653). 
 50.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-35. 
 51.  See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53 (“[T]he misappropriation theory outlaws trading 
on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not 
to a trading party, but to the source of the information.”); STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, 
at § 5.4. 
 52.  Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O’Hagan Resolves “Insider” Trading’s Most 
Vexing Problems, 23 DEL J. CORP L. 1, 19-20 (1998) (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652). 
 53.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2011); 
SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Rocklage 470 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2006).
 54.  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 55.  Id. at 647.  Unfortunately, attorneys allegedly have engaged in unlawful insider 
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representation; however, he learned about the proposed deal and purchased 
shares and options of the target company before the deal was made public 
with the expectation that the value of the shares would increase once the 
information about the deal was made public.56  Because O’Hagan’s law firm 
represented the bidding company, he did not owe a fiduciary duty to the 
target company’s stockholders and therefore could not be prosecuted under 
the classical theory of insider trading.57  Nevertheless, the Court held that 
O’Hagan was liable under the misappropriation theory because he had 
deceived both his law firm and its client by feigning loyalty to them while 
secretly converting information obtained from them into personal gain.58  As 
a result, the Supreme Court held that a trader commits fraud in connection 
with a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b), when the 
trader misappropriates material and nonpublic information for the purpose 
of engaging in a securities transaction, in breach of a duty owed to the source 
of the information.59
trading with some frequency. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 
March 31, 1989) (denying motion to dismiss charge against former law firm partner for 
misusing confidential client information); Santarlas, Exchange Act Release No. 62,460, 
[2010 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 89,060 (Jul. 7, 2010) (settlement) 
(suspending an attorney from practice because he entered into a scheme to trade on non-public 
information); U.S. v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss an indictment of an attorney on securities 
fraud charges for insider trading); see also MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER
SARBANES-OXLEY § 11.02 (2016) (discussing attorney liability for insider trading). 
 56.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48. See also id. at 653 n. 5 (“The Government could not 
have prosecuted O’Hagan under the classical theory, for O’Hagan was not an ‘insider’ of 
Pillsbury, the corporation in whose stock he traded.  Although an ‘outsider’ with respect to 
Pillsbury, O’Hagan had an intimate association with, and was found to have traded on 
confidential information from, Dorsey & Whitney, counsel to tender offeror Grand Met.  
Under the misappropriation theory, O’Hagan’s securities trading does not escape Exchange 
Act sanction, as it would under [the dissent’s reasoning], simply because he was associated 
with, and gained nonpublic information from, the bidder, rather than the target.”).
 57.  Id. at 653 n. 5; see also Newman, 773 F.3d at 445-46 (citing Obus, 693 F.3d at 285) 
(“Liability may attach where an ‘outsider’ possesses material non-public information about a 
corporation and another person uses that information to trade in breach of a duty owed to the 
owner.  In other words, such conduct violates Section 10(b) because the misappropriator 
engages in deception by pretending ‘loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the 
principal’s information for personal gain.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 58.  See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–55; see also Maio, 51 F.3d at 631 (quoting Cherif,
933 F.2d at 410) (“Under misappropriation theory a person violates Rule 10b-5 by 
‘misappropriating and trading upon material information entrusted to him by virtue of a 
fiduciary relationship . . . .’”). 
 59.  Compare O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 644-46 with the Supreme Court’s classical “special 
relationship” theory adopted in Chiarella, supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text, which 
established that a “duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction” exists only when directors, officers, and other insiders engage in 
trades of their respective company’s securities.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
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C. Tipping
Insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 extends 
beyond the primary parties of an insider trading transaction, applying to any 
party that disseminates material inside information (“tippers”) and any party 
that receives such information (“tippees”), if knowingly and improperly done 
for personal gain or to convey a gift.60  Because insider trading liability is 
premised on the breach of a requisite duty, “[a]n insider’s disclosure is 
improper when corporate information, intended to be available only for 
corporate purposes, is used for personal advantage.”61  This breach occurs 
when an inside tipper conveys material nonpublic information with the intent 
to personally benefit, or to provide a gift to the tippee-recipient.  A tippee 
incurs liability under Section 10(b) when he utilizes this information 
knowing of the inside tipper’s breach.62
 60.  See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (“Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but 
they [also] may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of 
exploiting the information for their personal gain.”); accord, Salman v. United States, 137 
S.Ct. 420 (2016); see also Hernandez v. U.S., 450 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1118 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 
2006) (“[U]nder the standard set forth in Dirks” a tippee can be liable under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10(b)–5 “if the tippee had knowledge of the insider-tipper’s personal gain.”); U.S. v. 
Santoro, 647 F.Supp. 153, 170–71 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“An allegation that the tippee knew of 
the tipper’s breach necessarily charges that the tippee knew that the tipper was acting for 
personal gain.”) rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
 61.  Maio, 51 F.3d at 632. 
 62.  See Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 428 (stating that the tippee violated Section 10(b) “by 
trading on the information with full knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed”).  A 
relatively recent case involving insider tipping is SEC v. Gupta, No. 11-CV-7566, 2013 WL 
3784138 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2013). This case is one of several causes of action associated with 
the hedge fund, Galleon Management.  See supra note 44.  This specific case involved an 
insider trading scheme in which former Goldman Sachs board member Rajat K. Gupta 
illegally tipped corporate secrets to former Galleon Management hedge fund manager, Raj 
Rajaratnam that were used by Rajaratnam to generate approximately $23 million in both 
profits and savings.  Gupta, 2013 WL 3784138 at *1. 
According to the SEC’s complaint, while serving on the boards of Goldman Sachs 
and Proctor & Gamble, Gupta had a variety of business dealings with Rajaratnam and stood 
to benefit from his relationship with him. Id.  Therefore, in order to gain favor with 
Rajaratnam, Gupta illegally tipped Rajaratnam with material and nonpublic information that 
Gupta obtained during his official duties at Goldman Sachs and Proctor & Gamble. Id.  The 
information concerned the quarterly earnings of both companies, as well as a yet unrealized 
$5 billion investment that Goldman Sachs had anticipated to receive from Berkshire 
Hathaway at the height of the financial crisis.  Id. As a result, the SEC alleged that Rajaratnam 
was responsible for various trades among certain Galleon funds based on Gupta’s inside 
information, and further shared the information with associates at Galleon who were also 
responsible for trading based on Gupta’s inside information ahead of public announcements 
by the respective companies. Id.
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 11 S
ide B
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 11 Side B      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/17 5:06 PM
256 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol.19:2 
Unlawful “tipping” under Section 10(b) is premised on whether the 
tipper breached a fiduciary duty (or a relationship of trust and confidence) 
by communicating the subject information to his tippee(s) and whether the 
subject tippee(s) knew of the breach.63  Without such a fiduciary breach, a 
tippee is entitled to lawfully trade and/or tip without incurring liability under 
Section 10(b).64  According to the Supreme Court, in order for liability to 
attach to a tipper/tippee in relation to intentional insider trading, an insider is 
deemed to have breached his fiduciary duty by tipping the subject 
information when the insider is motivated by the expectation of receiving a 
personal benefit.65  Typically, the “personal benefit” in question is of a 
pecuniary nature, such as cash or an elevation in social or professional status 
that carries the realistic potential to result in future financial benefits.66
The court found the confidential information discussed between Rajaratnam and 
Gupta to be “material.” Id. at *4.  The court also found that Gupta, a corporate insider based 
on his employment position with Goldman Sachs, had violated his fiduciary duty to his 
employer by communicating the information to Rajaratnam.  Id. at *11.  As a result, both 
Rajaratnam and Gupta were held to have violated Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of trading based 
on material nonpublic information.  Id.
On June 15, 2012, in a parallel criminal case arising out of the same facts, Gupta was 
convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and three counts of securities 
fraud.  U.S. v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012), aff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d 
Cir. 2014).  On October 24, 2012, Gupta was sentenced to two years in prison and one year 
of supervised release and ordered to pay a $5 million criminal fine.  On February 25, 2013, 
the court ordered Gupta to pay Goldman restitution of approximately $6.2 million.  Id.  On 
July 17, 2013, the SEC obtained a final judgment ordering Gupta to pay a $13.9 million 
penalty and also permanently barring him from serving as an officer or director of a public 
company. Gupta, 2013 WL 3784138.  Gupta unsuccessfully appealed his conviction.  Gupta,
904 F. Supp. 2d 349. 
 63.  Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 428.  The Supreme Court’s “should have known” language in 
Dirks is puzzling as that language suggests negligent culpability is sufficient for Section 10(b) 
liability.  But, such cannot be the case as Section 10(b) requires scienter to be proven.  The 
Court’s language in Salman supports this rationale. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying 
text.
64.  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. 
 65.  Id. at 663-64. 
 66.  Id.  The Court held that, in addition to the primary parties to an inside trading 
transaction, tippers and tippees may also be subject to Section 10(b)’s insider trading 
prohibition depending upon whether the tipper will gain a personal benefit from his tip.  Id.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. Id.  And, absent 
a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach by the tippee. Id.  In this case, Raymond 
Dirks, a security analyst, received confidential information from a former officer of an 
insurance company called Equity Funding Corporation (EFC). Id.  The former officer 
informed Dirks that EFC’s stock was grossly over-valued and that the company’s assets were 
overstated, due primarily to a high number of fraudulent policies that the company had issued.  
Id. at 649.  While attempting to ascertain the truth of the allegations, Dirks communicated the 
information to (1) the Wall Street Journal and (2) several of his institutional clients.  Id.  In 
regard to the Wall Street Journal, Dirks convinced the publication to write a series of articles 
that exposed EFC’s fraud. Id.  In regard to the clients of his firm, Dirks advised them (while 
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Further, a personal benefit is deemed to have resulted when the insider 
conveys the subject information as a gift: the gift of tipping the material and 
nonpublic information is likened to trading by the insider himself with the 
transfer to the tippee-recipient of the profits generated from the trades.67
investigating EFC’s fraud, but before the Wall Street Journal published the story) to sell their 
outstanding holdings in EFC. Id.  Acting on the information that Dirks provided, these clients 
sold large amounts of EFC stock in order to avoid the potential losses that would be incurred 
when the company’s fraud were to become public and thus likely cause the price of EFC’s 
stock to decline. Id.  The allegations were confirmed soon after, and EFC subsequently went 
into bankruptcy.  In response to Dirks’s acts of communicating the material and nonpublic 
information regarding EFC to his firm’s clients, the SEC brought suit against Dirks, alleging 
that he violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 650-51.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that Dirks 
did not violate Section 10(b) since the EFC insider had not acted with an improper motive in 
conveying the information to Dirks.  Rather, his motivation was to provide the information to 
Dirks in order to obtain his aid in exposing the fraud. Id. at 666.  Further, the Supreme Court 
held that a tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain “is derivative from that of the insider’s duty.”  
Id. at 659.  Thus, a tippee is only liable under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5 for trading on the 
basis of material and nonpublic information if the inside tipper breached a fiduciary duty in 
disclosing to the tippee. See Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016) (applying Dirks);
U.S. v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding that 
an individual engages in “misappropriation” for purposes of insider trading laws when he 
engages in “conduct constituting secreting, stealing, [or] purloining. . . [of] material non-
public information in breach of an employer-imposed fiduciary duty of confidentiality.”).  In 
determining whether the disclosure constituted such a breach of duty, the Court considered 
whether the inside tipper personally benefitted directly or indirectly from the disclosure to the 
tippee. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (concluding that “[a]bsent some personal gain [to the corporate 
insider], there has been no breach of duty to stockholders”).  The Court stated that “[n]ot only 
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed 
corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an 
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”  
Id. at 659–60 (emphasis added); see also SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 765 (W.D. Okla. 
Jul 2, 1984) (holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks “pointed out that, unlike 
insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, 
the typical tippee has no such fiduciary relationship”). 
67.  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.  Each theory of insider trading also may incur different 
elements for tipping liability.  For instance, under the classical “special relationship” theory 
of insider trading, fraudulent insider trading occurs when a corporate insider trades in the 
securities of the company to which the corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty when the trades 
are made on the basis of material and nonpublic information.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.  
This theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of a company 
but applies also to temporary “quasi-insiders” who may become fiduciaries of the company 
as a result of their capacity in service to the company (e.g., attorneys, accountants, consultants, 
etc.). Id. at 652.  Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, if a person who is 
liable for misappropriating confidential information subsequently “tips” another person, the 
“tippee” also is liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the tippee trades on the basis of 
the information if the tippee was aware of the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty to the tipper’s 
source of the information.  Id.  The Dirks court held that, to be liable under Section 10(b), “an 
inside tipper must gain some personal advantage in order for an outside tippee to be liable for 
trading on material nonpublic information.” SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 
1998).
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Liability for tipping related to insider trading hinges on establishing that 
the tipper-defendant gained a personal benefit from her actions.68  As an 
essential element of tipping liability, the requirement of the knowing receipt 
of a personal benefit is a significant cause of the existing void that exists as 
this element mandates that the defendant act intentionally.69  To fill this void 
of liability, a cause of action for insider trading-related tipping should exist 
between “no liability” and “intentional liability” that requires proof of a 
defendant’s negligence. 
II.  AN UNTAPPED REMEDY — SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT
A. Overview
Similar to Section 10(b), the language of Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act does not specifically proscribe insider trading.70  With some frequency, 
the SEC has pursued insider trading enforcement actions based upon the 
authority granted by this statute, and, in particular, ordinarily under Section 
17(a)(1).71  Congress enacted the Securities Act in direct response to the 
market crash of 1929 in order to promote investor protection, help ensure 
fair dealing, and enhance ethical business standards of honesty and fair 
dealing in regard to securities transactions.72  As discussed above, Section 
 68.  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 69.  See id. (noting that an inference of personal benefit may be drawn based on, inter
alia, “an intention to benefit the particular recipient”). 
 70.  See supra note 46 for the text of the statute. 
 71.  Like Section 10(b), Section 17(a)(1) requires proof of the defendant’s scienter.  See
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-96 (1980) (determining that the statutory language of 17(a)(1) implies 
a scienter requirement).  Without invoking any specific clause, the SEC has alleged violations 
of Section 17(a) in several landmark insider trading cases.  In Dirks, the SEC held that Dirks, 
by tipping, had aided and abetted the Section 17(a) violations of his selling tippees. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 650-51.  Although the D.C. Circuit affirmed the SEC’s censure of Dirks and the 
Supreme Court reversed the censure, neither court separately discussed the application of 
Section 17(a); instead, both focused on the application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Id.
at 653-67; Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 833-846 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  In Cady, Roberts & Co.,
the SEC held that the insider trading defendants violated both Section 17(a) and Section 10(b).  
40 SEC at 911. 
 For examples of more recent proceedings in which the SEC alleged that an insider 
trading defendant violated Section 17(a), see Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1; Adler, 137 F.3d 1325; 
Maio, 51 F.3d 623; SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
24, 2009); Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713; SEC v. Anton, 2009 WL 1109324 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 
2009); Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444; SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 
2006); Causey, Litigation Release No. 18776, 83 SEC Docket 850, 2004 WL 1531843 (Jul. 
8, 2004). 
 72.  See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (noting 
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17(a)(3) forbids “any person in the offer or sale of any securities” from 
engaging in any practice or transaction that would “directly or indirectly . . . 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”73  Based on this language, 
the SEC has invoked Section 17(a)(3) to a minimal extent in its pursuit of 
alleged insider trading violators.74  Perhaps surprisingly, to date, courts have 
given relatively little attention to the effect of this statute’s application to 
insider trading.  In those instances where courts have analyzed the 
application of Section 17(a)(3), they frequently do so concurrently, and with 
deference to, prior interpretations of Rule 10b-575 — perhaps under the 
incorrect perception that the two provisions are substantially similar.76
Although a few courts have treated the three subsections of Section 
17(a) as all being applicable to the same types of misconduct in the offer or 
sale of securities, courts generally have interpreted the three subsections as 
proscribing different types of misconduct.77  Specifically, most courts agree 
that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) are applicable to scenarios involving 
“scheme” liability, as subsection (a)(1) prohibits employing “any device, 
that a fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 “was to substitute a philosophy of 
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of 
business ethics in the securities industry”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2), 
quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953).  See also Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 
(explaining that the Securities Act was passed in the aftermath of the market crash in 1929 
“to achieve a high standard of business ethics . . . in every aspect of the securities industry”) 
(quoting Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186-87); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195  (“The 
Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to . . . protect investors against fraud and . . . to 
promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.”). 
 73.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).  See supra note 46 for the text of the entire statute. 
 74.  There have been a small number of insider trading cases in which a defendant agreed 
to settle to a lesser charge of negligence under Section 17(a)(3). See, e.g., In re Bolan, 2015 
SEC LEXIS 2201; SEC v. Shared Med. Sys. Corp., Litig. Rel. No. 14130, 56 SEC Docket 
2624, 1994 SEC LEXIS 1947 (June 22, 1994). 
 75.  See Maio, 51 F.3d at 631 (applying concurrently Section 17(a)(3) and Rule 10b-5). 
 76.  See Aragon, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 432 (“The elements required to establish violations 
of Sections 10(b) and 17(a) are ‘essentially the same.’”) (quoting SEC v. Monarch Funding 
Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 650 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 
2011); see also Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“The scienter 
requirement is the same in the two [S]ections [10(b) and 17(a)].”) (citing and misinterpreting 
Aaron), aff’d on other grounds, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 77.  See, e.g., Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308 (“Essentially the same elements 
[as those required to show a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] are required under 
Section 17(a)(1)-(3) in connection with the offer or sale of a security[.]”); see also In re John 
P. Flannery & James D. Hopkins, No. 3-14081 at 16 n.86 (SEC Dec. 15, 2014) (stating that 
Section 17(a) “is in many respects broader than [S]ection 10(b), the Section 17(a) claims could 
survive even absent deceptive conduct by the defendant himself”) (citing Klamberg v. Roth, 
473 F. Supp. 544, 556 (S.D.N.Y. Jun 22, 1979)), rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2015).
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 13 S
ide B
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 13 Side B      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/17 5:06 PM
260 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol.19:2 
scheme, or artifice to defraud”78 and subsection (a)(3) prohibits engaging in 
“any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”79  On the other hand, 
subsection (a)(2) is applicable to scenarios involving misrepresentation and 
half-truth liability, thus making it unlawful to obtain money or property by 
means of any materially false statement or half-truth of a material fact.80
Despite the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 17(a)(3) that the 
statute encompasses negligent conduct,81 it has been underutilized, and when 
rarely invoked, courts have often analyzed it concurrently with Rule 10b-5.82
While the language of Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) resemble provisions in 
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has concluded in Aaron v. SEC that although 
a scienter requirement applies to Section 10(b) and Section 17(a)(1), there is 
no such requirement of scienter with respect to Section 17(a)(2) and (3).83  In 
Aaron, the Supreme Court held that, in order to prove a violation of Section 
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, the SEC need only prove that the defendant 
acted with negligence.84  According to the Court, Section 17(a)(3) “quite 
 78.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1); see Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (applying § 17(a)(1) to petitioner’s 
scheme to defraud potential investors); Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (applying § 17(a)(1) to 
respondent’s scheme to defraud brokers). 
 79.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). 
 80.  See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011) (“To 
succeed on a misstatement claim under . . . Section 17(a)(2), the SEC must prove that the 
defendant made materially false statements or omissions.”) (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted); see also SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 2014 WL 2777434 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31 
2014) (applying 17(a)(2) to defendant banks who knowingly failed to disclose to investors the 
risks associated with mortgage backed securities), aff’d, SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 2014 
WL 2778498 (W.D.N.C. 2014). 
 81.  Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696-97. 
 82.  See generally Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308; Maio, 51 F.3d 623; Aragon,
672 F. Supp. 2d at 432; Wright, 571 F. Supp. At 662 (“The scienter requirement is the same 
in the two [S]ections [10(b) and 17(a)].”).
 83.  446 U.S. at 695-97; see also SEC v. GLT Dain Rascher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 856 (9th 
Cir. 2001); SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 1997); SEC v. First 
Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997); 
Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 342 ( “[T]he facts underlying their Section 10(b) convictions [of 
two insider trading defendants] establish civil liability under Section 17(a). . . . The Second 
Circuit has explained that ‘essentially the same elements’ are required to prove fraud under 
Section 17(a) as are required under Section 10(b), ‘though no showing of scienter is required 
for the SEC to obtain an injunction under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3) [of Section 17].’”) (citing 
Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308); SEC v. Soroosh, 1997 WL 487434 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 5, 1997) (insider trading case), aff’d, 166 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished 
decision); John H. Sturc & Catherine W. Cummer, Possession v. Use for Insider Trading 
Liability, 12 INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR 6, Jun. 1998, at 3 (“Thus, 
in theory, liability could be imposed under Section 17(a) for a kind of ‘negligent’ trading 
while in possession of inside information.”). 
 84.  Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697. 
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plainly focuses upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the 
investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person 
responsible.”85  As a result, the combined use of each of these individual 
provisions provides the SEC with the ability to enforce violations of 
securities laws and pursue causes of action based on different standards of 
mental culpability — either the higher standard of scienter or the lower 
standard of negligence, depending on the facts and circumstances 
presented.86  However, the use of Section 17(a)’s provisions has been 
primarily focused on enforcement of schemes involving fraud or market 
manipulation — not insider trading.87  One may wonder why has the SEC 
neglected to use this powerful weapon in its “war” on insider trading.88
 85.  Id. Further, the Supreme Court held that Section 17(a)(3) “does not require a 
‘showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.’”  Id.
(quoting Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 200). 
 86.  See supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text; see also Corey v. Bache & Co., 355
F.Supp. 1123 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 12, 1973) (decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Aaron, explaining that Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 may be applied “to negligent as well as 
intentional representations”).
 87.  See SEC v. Geotek, 426 F.Supp. 715 (1976), aff’d 590 F.2d 785 (applying negligence 
standard, i.e., ordinary care or due diligence, in resolving claims asserted by Commission in 
statutory enforcement proceedings, specifically, claims that defendants made material 
misstatements and/or omissions in prospectuses, limited partnership agreements and 
management agreements as well as in offering circulars and program agreements for joint 
ventures and in certain program receipts and disbursement financial statements and that 
certified public accountant made material misrepresentations and/or omissions in its audit 
certifications of the financial statements).  In re John P. Flannery & James D. Hopkins was a 
case where the SEC found the respondent, John P. Flannery liable under Section 17(a)(3) as 
a result of the defendants’ lack of adequate disclosure in two letters to investors for which the 
defendant was “negligent with respect to his contributions to and approval of . . .”  No. 3-
14081 (SEC Dec. 15, 2014) at 45, rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).  
Although Flannery was not shown to have acted with scienter, he was found liable for 
negligently misleading investors based on the fact that the Commission found that “the danger 
of misleading investors was not so obvious that Flannery ‘must have been’ aware of it.” Id.
at 45 (emphasis added) (citing SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intern. Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1093-
94 (9th Cir. 2010)).  In its decision, the Commission found that, contrary to Section 10(b), 
Section 17(a) does not contain language that requires the proscribed conduct to be 
“manipulative or deceptive.” Id.  In other words, there is “no textual basis” for concluding 
that Section 17(a) requires that the defendant’s violative conduct itself be “manipulative or 
deceptive” as is required under Rule 10b-5.  Furthermore, the Commission stated that, based 
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ernst & Ernst, the words “manipulative or deceptive” in 
conjunction with “device or contrivance” strongly suggest that Section 10(b)’s sole purpose 
is “‘to proscribe knowing or intentional’ – rather than negligent – misconduct.” Id. at 22-23 
(citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197).  Subsequently, the First Circuit overturned the ruling 
and held that the agency’s decision was “not supported by substantial evidence.”  Flannery v. 
SEC, 810 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 88.  See supra note 26. 
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B. Differences Between Section 10(b) and Section 17(a) 
Although Section 17(a) and the more familiar Section 10(b) share many 
similarities in language and structure, the two provisions are different in 
important ways.89  Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 cover 
proscribed misconduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”90  In contrast, liability under Section 17(a) is limited to acts “in the 
offer or sale of any securities.”91  The result of this contrasting language is 
that Section 10(b) is interpreted to apply to purchases and sales while Section 
17(a) is interpreted to apply to sales or offers to sell only.92
The wording of Section 17(a) is further different than the wording of 
Section 10(b).93  Contrary to Section 10(b), Section 17(a) does not contain 
language that requires the proscribed conduct to be “manipulative or 
deceptive.”  In other words, as stated by the SEC, there is “no textual basis 
for concluding that Rule 10b-5’s requirement that the defendant’s violative 
 89.  Note that the parameters of Rule 10b-5 are confined by the statute upon which it is 
based – namely, Section 10(b); see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 
(1977) (“The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the 
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law.  Rather, it is ‘the power to 
adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.’”) 
(quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 213-14); see generally Ralph C. Ferrara and Marc I. 
Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 263 (1980).  While essentially the same elements are required to prove fraud under both 
Section 17(a) and Section 10(b), there is no requirement to prove scienter under Section 
17(a)(2) or (a)(3). See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696-97. 
 90.  15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 91.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
92.  See, e.g., SEC v. Namer, 2004 WL 2199471, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004); 
SEC v. Roor, 2004 WL 1933578, at *13-*15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2004); SEC v. McCaskey, 
2001 WL 1029053, at *4–*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001).  In his treatise Fundamentals of 
Securities Regulation (1988), Professor Louis Loss, the premier securities scholar of his era, 
commented that Section 17(a): 
refers to fraud or misrepresentation “in the offer or sale of any securities.”  It is 
perhaps arguable that this does not limit the application of the Section to cases of 
fraud by sellers as distinct from fraud by buyers of securities—that it was 
intended merely to make it clear that § 17(a), in contrast to the mail fraud statute, 
is restricted to the securities field.  However, the Commission has never sought 
to apply § 17(a) except against fraudulent sellers.
Id. at 839 (emphasis in original).  Although this argument may be viable with respect to 
Section 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(2), it is not regarding Section 17(a)(3) due to that provision’s clear 
language that the fraud or deceit must be “upon the purchaser.” 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). 
 93.  See In re Cady, 40 SEC. at 911 n.11: 
The language of Rule 10b-5 is broader in several respects than that of Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act.  Thus, while Section 17(a) prohibits fraudulent or 
deceptive practices “in the offer or sale” of any security, Rule 10b-5 prohibits 
such activities “in connection with the purchase or sale” of any security. 
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conduct itself be ‘manipulative or deceptive’ also applies to Section 17(a).”94
Based on the wording of Section 17(a), the Supreme Court has held that, 
while scienter is the required mens rea for a violation under Section 17(a)(1), 
it is not the case for violations of Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3).95  Rather, a 
showing of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation under these 
provisions.96
C. Proposed Amendment 
The SEC thus is empowered to institute a claim of insider trading 
against a defendant under Section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) without the 
requirement of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally 
– in other words, that the defendant acted negligently.97  However, Section 
17(a)(2) is not an effective weapon against insider trading due to its narrow 
application to “untrue statement” liability.98  That statute is inapplicable to 
the insider trading scenario since a typical insider trade is not premised on 
an affirmative “untrue statement.”  Rather, it is assessed on “scheme” 
liability or the trader’s omission of a statement.  Insider trading involves 
nondisclosure rather than the making of affirmative statements.99
The scope of Section 17(a)(3) covers fraudulent sales but does not cover 
fraudulent purchases.  Thus, Section 17(a)(3) reaches defendants who 
constructively defraud purchasers, but Section 17(a)(3)’s scope does not 
cover defendants that defraud sellers.100  Section 17(a)(3)’s scope also 
 94.  In re Flannery, No. 3-14081 (Dec. 15, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2015).  However, this is not accurate for Section 17(a)(1).  Also, this is not to suggest 
that Section 17(a) reaches breaches of fiduciary duty where there is no disclosure deficiency.
See generally Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462; Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1. 
 95.  Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697. 
 96.  Id.
 97.  Note that Section 17(a)(2) normally is inapplicable to insider trading as the defendant 
trader or tippee does not make a statement.  Hence, because Section 17(a)(2) focuses on 
material misrepresentations and half-truths, that provision does not extend to deceptive 
conduct based on silence. See generally In re Flannery, Release No. 3981, 2014 WL 
7145625, rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). See supra note 87. 
 98.  See generally STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3. 
 99.  Contra Dirks, 47 SEC 434, 448 n. 51 (1981) (“And all of our findings against Dirks 
[a tippee/tipper] are made under both those Sections [17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)].”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). But cf. SEC v. Davis, 689 F. Supp. 767, 773-74 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 29, 1988) (refusing to dismiss a complaint against insider trading defendant based in 
part on Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)—defendant did not argue specifically that Section 
17(a)(2) did not apply). 
 100.  See Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (reading the language of § 17(a) to indicate that scienter is 
not required under § 17(a)(2) and (3)).  It should also be noted that Section 17(a) is modeled 
on the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (enacted 1872).  Robert A. Prentice, 
Scheme Liability: Does it Have a Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 351, 365 n. 
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extends to tipping that constructively defrauds purchasers.  Accordingly, a 
tip that generates a defendant’s sale (resulting from bearish inside 
information known as the “bad news” scenario), could violate the statute 
while a tip that induces a defendant’s purchase (resulting from bullish inside 
information known as the “good news” scenario), would not violate the 
statute. 
With a minimal legislative amendment to modify Section 17(a)’s 
language to more closely resemble the language of Rule 10b-5, Section 
17(a)(3) would allow the SEC to cast a wider net to enforce insider trading 
violations against a broader range of misconduct.  Firstly, the word “offer” 
should be replaced in the text preceding all three clauses of Section 17(a) 
with “purchase” (as in Section 10(b)).  By doing so, Section 17(a) will be 
applicable to scenarios in which misconduct is engaged in by means of either 
a purchase or a sale, thereby broadening the statute’s current scope of 
liability (which is limited only to misconduct perpetrated by means of an 
“offer or sale”).  Secondly, adding the phrase “or the offer thereof” following 
the revised language of “purchase or sale of any securities,” Section 17(a)(3) 
will be applicable to scenarios in which misconduct occurred irrespective of 
whether the contemplated transaction is completed.  Thirdly, the language of 
Section 17(a)(3) should be amended by replacing the words “fraud . . . upon 
the purchaser” with “fraud . . . upon any person” (as in Rule 10b-5(c)).  
Pursuant to the proposed amendment, Section 17(a)(3) would then be 
applicable to scenarios in which any person, regardless of whether he or she 
was a purchaser or seller, was a victim of negligent deficient disclosure 
committed by means of either a purchase or sale, further broadening Section 
17(a)(3)’s scope.  Thus, the suggested amended version of Section 17(a) 
reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the purchase or sale of any 
securities, or the offer thereof, by the use of any means or 
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 
77. See also In re Cady supra note 93, at 837-39.  Applying language in that statute similar 
to Section 17(a), the Second Circuit has held that the statute does not require that “the 
defendant must receive the same money or property that the deceived party lost, but only that 
the party deceived must lose money or property.”  United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 39-
40 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Kelling v. United States, 193 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1951) (concluding 
that in prosecution on counts charging violations of Section 17(a), which prohibits 
employment of any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in sale of securities by use of means 
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of mails directly or 
indirectly, and § 1341 of Title 18, which prohibits use of mails to execute scheme or artifice 
to defraud or obtain money by fraudulent representations, evidence sustained findings that 
defendants knowingly made false representations for purpose of effectuating a scheme to 
defraud, that representations were relied on causing loss and that defendant used means and 
instruments of transportation in commerce and the mails in perpetrating certain frauds). 
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commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement 
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person.101
With these changes to the statute, the amended Section 17(a)(3) would 
broaden the statute’s scope of liability as a government right of action.  The 
impact of the proposed statute would not implicate private rights of action, 
as courts have declined to imply a private remedy for violations of Section 
17(a).102  Consequently, the concern that expanding the scope of an antifraud 
statute would facilitate the onset of private claims does not arise under the 
proposed amendment.103
In addition to being similar to the language of Rule 10b-5(c), the 
resulting language of the proposed amendment would also resemble Section 
206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which provides in pertinent 
part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly 
or indirectly - 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client 
or prospective client; [or] 
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
 101.  15 U.S.C. § 77q. 
 102.  No private right of action exists for a violation of Section 17(a)(3).  While several 
older cases imply such a private right of action, (See, e.g., Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 
(4th Cir. 1975)), subsequent court decisions have consistently declined to follow suit.  See,
e.g., Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1992); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines 
& Jones, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F. 2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1988); Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 F.2d 
780 (11th Cir. 1988); Krause v. Prettyman, 827 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Washington 
Pub. Power Supply Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
 103.  See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t would 
appear that the Cort test as applied to § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 points away from 
the implication of a private cause of action.  This, together with the Supreme Court’s 
conservative interpretation of the test in recent years, leads us to the conclusion that the district 
court correctly dismissed this theory of relief [thereby denying the existence of a § 17(a) 
private right of action]”). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 US 66 (1975) (establishing a four-prong 
test for determining whether a private right of action can be inferred under a particular statute); 
Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 33 (1979) (discussing alterations made to the Cort test by subsequent Supreme Court 
case law). 
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which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective 
client; . . .104
Although this statute is applicable only to investment advisers, its 
language is substantially similar to Section 17(a).  Furthermore, court 
interpretations of Section 206(2) hold that a violation of this statute “may 
rest on a finding of simple negligence.”105  In this manner, Section 206 is 
broader than Section 10(b).  For instance, unlike Section 10(b), which is 
limited to situations involving deception or manipulation in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security, Section 206 may extend to negligent 
conduct that is deemed to constitute constructive fraud.106
Based on Section 17(a)(3)’s current statutory language, buttressed by 
the comparable language of Section 206(2), Section 17(a)(3) now provides 
 104.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. 
 105.  SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191). Capital Gains Research Bureau is a significant case in 
regard to the interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act.  375 U.S. 180.  According to the 
House Report on the Investment Advisers Act, one of the goals of the Advisers Act was “to 
protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts 
and to safeguard the honest investment adviser against the stigma of the activities of these 
individuals by making fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful.”  H.R. Rep. No. 
2639, at 28 (1940).  In order to achieve this goal, Congress enacted a handful of broad 
antifraud provisions intended to eliminate conflicts of interest through full disclosure. See
SEC, FINANCIAL PLANNERS: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE’S SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE, at A-7 (1988).  However, the Advisers Act did not 
originally define the fiduciary duty nor the standard of care that investment advisers owed to 
their clients.  This changed in 1963 when the Supreme Court interpreted the Advisers Act as, 
in fact, establishing federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180.  Drawing on the Act’s “broad proscription against any 
practice which operates as a fraud or deceit upon” the client, as well as Congress’s intent to 
“preserve the personalized character of the services of investment advisers and to eliminate 
conflicts of interest between the investment adviser and the clients,” the Court concluded that 
the Advisers Act “reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship. . . .” Id. at 191–92 (internal quotations and alterations 
omitted); see also Transamerica Mortg. Adv., Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (“As we 
have previously recognized, § 206 [of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940] establishes 
‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment advisers. . .”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also 17 C.F.R. § 204(4)-8 (2007); Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to 
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisors, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756 (Aug. 9, 
2007) (stating that § 204(4)-8 “prohibits advisers to pooled investment vehicles from making 
false or misleading statements to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or prospective investors 
in those pooled vehicles”).  Under this rule, the SEC has indicated that it will apply a 
negligence standard. Id. at 44,759. 
 106.  As a general matter, the SEC may bring an enforcement action under Section 206 
even if there is no actual injury to a client or investor. See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 
711 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Violations of the antifraud provisions of Sections 206 of the Investment 
Advisers Act also do not depend on actual injury to any client.”). 
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the SEC with authority in certain circumstances to pursue negligent inside 
traders107—namely, when a person negligently sells securities to a purchaser 
while the seller is in possession of adverse material nonpublic information 
(as contrasted with intentional insider trading, in which a person trades while 
aware of material, nonpublic information regarding the security).108  The 
wherewithal to bring insider trading charges based on negligence represents 
a significantly lighter burden than the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.109  Therefore, Section 17(a)(3)’s lower mental culpability 
level, accompanied with the suggested amendment, would provide the SEC 
with an important enforcement tool whenever the applicable facts are 
insufficient to prove scienter. 
D. The Proposed Amendment Will Not Lead to Vexatious Litigation 
Critics of the proposed amendment to Section 17(a)(3) may contend that 
the proposed amendment, by encompassing negligent insider trading, would 
open the floodgates for plaintiff-investors to bring nuisance claims.  As 
discussed above, this argument is untenable; contrary to Section 10(b), no 
private right of action exists for a violation of Section 17(a)(3).  Although a 
number of older cases implied such a private right of action,110 subsequent 
appellate court decisions have consistently declined to imply a private 
remedy.111  Applying the Supreme Court’s strict statutory construction to 
implied rights of action,112 lower courts — for well over three decades — 
have held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under 
 107.  See Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
 108.  See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 
(2000), which provides: 
(a) General.  The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of 
the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other 
things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic 
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that 
is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the 
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material 
nonpublic information. 
 109.  See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701 (requiring a showing of “scienter,” or intent, in Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 enforcement actions). 
 110.  See, e.g., Newman, 518 F.2d at 99 (4th Cir. 1975); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont 
Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D.P.R. 1978); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
 111.  See, e.g., supra note 101.
 112.  See Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11 (construing two sections of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 strictly in finding a limited private remedy); see also Cort, 422 U.S. 66 (holding 
that no private cause of action is implied from a criminal statute prohibiting certain 
expenditures in corporate elections). 
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Section 17(a).113
III. NEGLIGENT INSIDER TRADING UNDER SECTION 17(A)(3)
As set forth above, negligence is sufficient to constitute a violation of 
Section 17(a)(3).114  The language of Section 17(a)(3) prohibits engaging in 
“any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”115  Therefore, pursuant to 
Section 17(a)(3)’s current language, the SEC must prove that a negligent 
offer or sale occurred when the defendant was in possession of material and 
nonpublic information, thereby acting as a fraud “upon the purchaser.”116
Such misconduct ordinarily occurs where the alleged violator sells securities 
in order to avoid a loss (i.e., the “bad news” situation). 
Liability for negligent insider trading is premised upon a combination 
of three legal concepts: (1) common law negligence;117 (2) constructive 
negligent fraud118 (as interpreted by case law in which the SEC has invoked 
Section 17(a)(3)119); and (3) case law that has established the elements of 
 113.  See, e.g., Landry, 688 F.2d at 391. 
 114.  See Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (holding the SEC does not need to establish scienter under 
Section 17(a)(3)). 
 115.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). 
 116.  See Russell G. Ryan, Recent SEC Insider Trading Settlements Reflect Promising 
Signs of Flexibility, 20 INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR 4, Apr. 2006, 
at 2 (“In cases when the unlawful [insider] trade was a sale of securities, the SEC typically 
adds a charge under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 . . .”). 
 117.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Negligence” as: 
The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal 
standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except 
for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’ 
rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the 
particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under 
the circumstances. 
Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 118.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Fraud” as: 
2. A reckless misrepresentation made without justified belief in its truth to induce 
another person to act. 
3. A tort arising from a knowing or reckless misrepresentation or concealment of 
material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment . . . 
4. Unconscionable dealing . . . the unfair use of the power arising out of the 
parties’ relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain. 
Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added)).  Further, the subentry 
of constructive fraud is defined as “1. Unintentional deception or misrepresentation that 
causes injury to another.” Id.
 119.  See Bank of America Corp., 2014 WL 2777434.  The SEC filed a complaint against 
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unlawful insider trading.120  Although Section 17(a)(3) is limited to the “offer 
or sale of any securities,” the statute is clear in its prohibition of “any 
transaction” that “operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.”121  Since 
an improper insider trade is a “transaction” that “operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit,” insider trading falls within the category of transactions 
that Section 17(a)(3) prohibits (albeit limited only to sales).  Accordingly, as 
held by the Supreme Court, an actionable disclosure deficiency under 
Section 17(a)(3) is subject to a mens rea of negligence122 and focuses “upon 
the effect of particular conduct on members of the investing public, rather 
than upon the culpability of the person responsible.”123  Thus, in addition to 
several subsidiaries of Bank of America based on allegations of material misrepresentations 
and omissions made by the defendants in a prospectus and prospectus supplement issued for 
residential mortgage backed securities offered and underwritten by the defendants.  Id. at *4.
In 2008, the defendants offered and underwrote certificates that provided investors a right of 
payment from a pool of residential mortgages. Id. at *2.  The final loan pool included 1,191 
adjustable rate mortgages, each of which generally consisted of a principal of more than 
$417,000. Id. at *3, n. 1.  Prior to filing the prospectus and prospectus supplement in January 
of 2008, the defendants provided preliminary information to investing banks claiming that 
approximately seventy percent of the final loan pool of the securities had been originated from 
the “‘wholesale channel,’ or third party mortgage brokers.”  Id. at *1.  However, when the 
defendants later filed the prospectus and prospectus supplement, the defendants contradicted 
their description of the mortgage characteristics by stating that only “some” of the mortgages 
contained in the final loan pool had been originated in the wholesale channel as opposed to 
the original description of “approximately seventy percent” having been originated.  Id.  In 
fact, seventy-two percent of the mortgages originated in the wholesale channel, representing 
a high degree of risk to investors. Id. at *3.  As a result, the SEC alleged that, by failing to 
disclose the true nature of the loans that comprised the loan pool, and by failing to disclose 
the potential risks associated with this type of security, the defendants had acted negligently.  
Id. at *4.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the charges alleged by the SEC based on 
the argument that the Complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to establish negligence (as the 
sufficient mens rea under Section 17(a)(3)). Id. at *8.  In denying the defendants’ motion, the 
court addressed the sufficiency of the SEC’s allegations to satisfy the negligence requirement 
of Section 17(a)(3).  Id.  Specifically, the court held that the SEC adequately alleged sufficient 
facts under Section 17(a)(3) that defendants had negligently misrepresented and failed to 
disclose information that the defendants “knew or reasonably should have known  . . . was 
material.”  Id. at *11. 
 120.  See supra notes 34-67 and accompanying text. 
 121.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). 
 122.  See, e.g., Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (finding no ambiguity in the wording of Section 
17(a) and reversing the appellate court’s decision). 
 123.  Aaron, 446 U.S at 697 (emphasis omitted).  Further, “[t]his reading follows directly 
from Capital Gains, which attributed to a similarly worded provision in § 206(2) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 a meaning that does not require a ‘showing [of] deliberate 
dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.’” Id. (quoting Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 200).  The Supreme Court has also stated that “Congress 
intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed ‘not 
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purpose.’”  Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting Capital Gains Research 
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prosecuting insider trading claims under Rule 10b-5 — where scienter must 
be proven — the current version of Section 17(a)(3) empowers the SEC to 
pursue a negligent insider trading cause of action against defendants who 
engage in proscribed conduct in the “offer or sale” of securities (such as an 
insider who sells stock in order to avoid a loss — the “bad news” scenario).124
Bureau, 375 U.S. at 195). 
 124.  One insider trading case in which the insider was the seller and the SEC failed to 
successfully prosecute under Rule 10b-5, but may have successfully prosecuted under the 
current version of Section 17(a)(3) under a theory of negligence, is SEC v. Moshayedi, (Civil 
Action No. 12-cv-01179 (C.D. Cal Jun. 6, 2014)).  In Moshayedi, the SEC brought an insider 
trading suit against Manouchehr Moshayedi, the co-founder and CEO of STEC Inc., a 
company that manufactures and sells computer storage devices.  The alleged insider trades 
that Moshayedi transacted were in advance of a STEC secondary offering in which, according 
to the SEC, Moshayedi sold a substantial portion of his company’s stock while in possession 
of material and nonpublic information regarding one of STEC’s largest customers. 
According to the SEC’s complaint: during an eight-month period beginning in 
January 2009, STEC stock increased in price over 800 percent due to increased profits and 
sales margins.  During this period, STEC also announced an agreement with its largest 
customer, EMC Corp., to supply STEC’s top-selling product – flash drives.  Moshayedi and 
his brother Mark allegedly planned to take advantage of the stock’s price increase by selling 
a large block of their shares in a secondary offering that was scheduled to coincide with the 
release of STEC’s second-quarter results.  Complaint, SEC v. Moshayedi, Civil Action No. 
12-CV-01179, at 2-3. 
Shortly before the secondary offering, EMC informed Moshayedi that it would not 
enter into another similar agreement with STEC for the third quarter of 2009.  Moshayedi also 
received an internal report indicating that EMC’s actual demand for the flash drives in the last 
two quarters of the year would not be sufficient to ensure that STEC would meet guidance or 
the consensus analyst estimates.  The SEC alleged that, after learning these facts, Moshayedi 
engaged in a “fraudulent scheme to conceal” EMC’s actual demand so that the planned 
secondary offering could proceed.  The “scheme to conceal” consisted of a secret deal with 
EMC in which EMC committed to purchase a larger quantity of flash drives from STEC 
(allegedly more than was required or necessary) in the third quarter of 2009 at a substantial 
discount.  After this deal was in place, Moshayedi announced guidance for the third quarter 
that met the consensus estimate.  That guidance included proceeds from the secret deal that 
were more than twice as much as EMC’s forecasted demand for the quarter.  The SEC alleged 
that these guidance numbers were only possible because of the secret deal between STEC and 
EMC.  Id. at 3-4. 
The secondary offering proceeded as scheduled.  Moshayedi and his brothers each 
sold 4.5 million shares of STEC stock.  Three months later, in connection with the release of 
its third quarter earnings results, STEC disclosed that EMC had not disposed of a substantial 
amount of inventory purchased from STEC, and would therefore, possibly continue to carry 
unsold inventory of STEC product into 2010.  Subsequently, the price of STEC stock dropped 
38.9 percent from nearly $23 per share to just above $14. Id. at 4.
Moshayedi disputed the Commission’s claims and stated that there was nothing 
inappropriate about the alleged “secret deal.”  Moshayedi claimed that the deal was not 
entered into for the purpose of fabricating guidance numbers.  Rather, he asserted that the deal 
provided STEC with knowledge regarding EMC’s purchasing ability.  During closing 
arguments, Moshayedi’s lawyer argued that Moshayedi did not enter into the “side 
agreement” to profit from the secondary offering, but instead to “avoid the chaos of [the 
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Pursuant to Section 17(a)(3), the SEC may pursue negligent insider 
trading causes of action, but only against a person — in breach of a duty 
owed — that negligently sells (or offers to sell) securities, or tips a third party 
when such person possesses material and nonpublic information.125  As such, 
the elements of a negligent insider trading cause of action, enforceable under 
the current version of Section 17(a)(3), are: (1) selling (or offering to sell) a 
security (2) in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and 
confidence (3) that occurs as a result of (4) a negligent (5) failure to 
adequately disclose (6) material and nonpublic information (7) that (either 
directly or indirectly) results in a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 126
A. “Possession” v. “Awareness” in the Context of Negligent Insider 
customer] ordering late in the quarter.”  Edvard Pettersson & Maurice Possley, SEC Loses 
Latest Insider-Trading Trial to Former STEC CEO, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 7, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/sec-loses-latest-insider-trading-trial-to-former-stec-
ceo.html [https://perma.cc/8E2S-S8DS]. 
Ultimately, a jury rejected the SEC’s claims and found Moshayedi not liable for 
insider trading.  The jury’s decision rested on a contradiction between EMC’s notice to STEC 
that it would not enter into another contract and the fact that, at the time, Moshayedi was 
engaged in negotiations with EMC, which went on for a considerable period, over a separate 
and unrelated contract.  While EMC’s notice to STEC regarding the purchase of flash drives 
does state it would not enter into another agreement, the jury concluded that the notice was 
simply a negotiating tactic used in the context of ongoing negotiations. 
Although the SEC failed to successfully prosecute Moshayedi under a theory of 
scienter, an argument can be made that Moshayedi negligently traded based on material and 
nonpublic information.  The argument is as follows:  Moshayedi, as CEO of STEC, Inc., owed 
a duty to STEC, Inc. to avoid self-dealing.  Although a jury held that Moshayedi did not 
intentionally breach the duty to STEC to avoid self-dealing, Moshayedi’s sale of STEC stock 
in the secondary offering may be viewed as self-dealing because he allegedly took advantage 
of, and profited from, a fabricated increase in the price of STEC stock, regardless of whether 
or not it was intentional.  Further, the purchasers of Moshayedi’s stock were prejudiced based 
on Moshayedi’s failure to disclose the material and nonpublic information that he possessed.  
This failure to disclose resulted in the purchasers losing money once the price of the stock 
declined.  Thus, without the disclosure of material and nonpublic information in the 
impersonal trading markets, constructive fraud was committed “upon the purchaser.”  
Therefore, Moshayedi’s alleged actions remain susceptible to enforcement under both the 
current and the yet-to-be-amended version of Section 17(a)(3).  Regardless of the fact that he 
did not intentionally trade the STEC stock based on material and nonpublic information, the 
allegations suggest that, under the authority of the current version of Section 17(a)(3), 
Moshayedi’s actions “in the offer or sale of . . . securities . . . indirectly . . . operate[d] as a 
fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).  This liability is unchanged under 
the authority of the yet-to-be-amended version of Section 17(a)(3), which would still invoke 
liability since Moshayedi’s alleged actions “in the purchase or sale of . . . securities . . . 
indirectly . . . operate[d] as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”
 125.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). 
 126.  Id.
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Trading
Contrasted with Section 10(b), which has an “awareness” 
requirement,127 “possession” of material and nonpublic information is the 
proper standard for a cause of action for negligent insider trading under 
Section 17(a)(3).128  With respect to Section 10(b), in order to be held liable 
for insider trading, a defendant must do more than merely “possess” material 
and nonpublic information.129  Rather, pursuant to Rule 10b5-1, the scienter 
requirement of Section 10(b) is deemed to be fulfilled with proof that the 
defendant purchased or sold securities while “aware” of material nonpublic 
information at the time of the purchase or sale.130  Thus, Rule 10b5-1 posits 
that one who is aware of material and nonpublic information at the time of 
the purchase or sale will inevitably make use of such information.131
It follows that a cause of action for negligent insider trading cannot 
logically support the requisite level of culpability for intentional insider 
trading under Section 10(b), because, by definition, the “awareness” standard 
maintains the implication of willful intent.  Thus, in order to pursue a cause 
of action for negligent insider trading, the “awareness” element of intentional 
insider trading must be abandoned in order to conform to a lesser culpability 
standard upon which negligent causes of action are based.  This is satisfied 
with the “possession” standard – namely, when a defendant improperly 
trades or tips while possessing information that the defendant knows, or 
should know, is material and nonpublic. 
 127.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1; see also discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 128.  Sturc & Cummer, supra note 83. 
 129.  See US v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting the “use” rather than 
“possession” standard); see also Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337 (holding that Section 10(b)’s scienter 
requirement mandates proof that, when the defendant traded the subject securities, they 
actually used the material and nonpublic information, rather than merely possess it).  In the 
past, the SEC has opined that mere “possession,” rather than “use,” of the material nonpublic 
information is sufficient to trigger liability under Section 10(b).  See Report of the 
Investigation in the Matter of Sterling Drug, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14675 
(Apr. 18, 1978) (asserting that “[i]f an insider sells his securities while in possession of 
material adverse non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his position 
to the detriment of the public”).  The Second Circuit has also endorsed the “possession” 
standard by stating that “material information can not [sic] lay idle in the human brain.”  
United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993). But see Gansman, 657 F.3d at 92 
(stating “In prosecuting a putative ‘tipper’ under the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading, the government must prove as an element of the offense that the tipper conveyed 
material nonpublic information to his ‘tippee’ with the understanding that it would be used
for securities trading purposes.”) (emphasis added). 
 130.  Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-43154 (2000). 
 131.  Supra note 122. 
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B. The Misappropriation Theory and the Language of Section 
17(a)(3)
If construed in a remedial manner, application of the misappropriation 
theory in the Section 17(a)(3) context effectuates a broad reach of insider 
trading liability based on negligence.  As discussed above, the 
misappropriation theory premises liability on deception of the source of the 
information, rather than on deception of shareholders — as with the classical 
“special relationship” theory.132  By contrast, a more expansive application 
of the misappropriation theory within the context of Section 17(a)(3) may be 
invoked by focusing on the statute’s use of the word “indirectly.” 
Section 17(a)(3) addresses the proscription against deficient disclosure 
in the “offer or sale” setting.  When Section 17(a)(3) is viewed in its entirety, 
with the inclusion of the statute’s introductory paragraph, the word 
“indirectly” alters the scope of the provision by broadening the range of 
potential defendants that come within its reach — regardless of the proposed 
amendment. 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any 
securities . . . by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use 
of the mails, directly or indirectly— . . .(3) to engage in any 
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.133
The inclusion of the word “indirectly” encompasses any transaction, 
practice, or course of business committed by a person that indirectly operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser.134  In the context of 
 132.  See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text. 
 133.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
 134.  See SEC v. Syron, 934 F. Supp. 2d 609, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (holding 
that the SEC failed to allege that defendants personally gained money or property from the 
employer’s stock offering, but acknowledging that liability may exist when the money is 
obtained “indirectly” or in a “highly roundabout manner”) (emphasis added); see also SEC v. 
Mudd, 885 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668-71 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) (showing SEC sufficiently 
pleading that Federal National Mortgage Association’s (FNMA) Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Chief Risk Officer (CRO) directly or indirectly obtained money or property by 
means of false statements regarding percentage of loans that fell into FNMA’s subprime and 
low-documentation loan descriptions because each received a bonus that was tied to both 
FNMA’s performance and their own personal performance in attaining individual year-end 
goals and that their false statements in the offer and sale of FNMA securities were sufficient 
to state a claim under the antifraud section of the Securities Act); SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 
2d 457, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 6, 2012) (demonstrating the SEC sufficiently pleading that 
broker-dealer’s director, acting as its agent, facilitated a fraud in violation of antifraud section 
of the Securities Act; the Act clearly provided that violation could occur if defendant obtained 
funds either “directly or indirectly” and SEC alleged that director had obtained millions of 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 20 S
ide B
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 20 Side B      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/17 5:06 PM
274 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol.19:2 
insider trading, one theory by which a defendant can be held liable as a result 
of an “indirect” violation of insider trading laws is the misappropriation 
theory.135
Although the securities laws do not define the term “indirectly,” 
congressional history suggests that insider trading provisions — especially 
those regarding the misappropriation theory — are intended to have a 
flexible scope,136 thus, lending credibility to the proposed amendment as well 
as the theory of negligent insider trading.  An example of the intended scope 
of insider trading provisions comes from the legislative history of the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.137  This Act, among 
other things: (1) expanded the scope of civil penalties to control persons who 
fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading;138 (2) granted the SEC 
authority to award payments to persons who provide information regarding 
insider trading violations; and, most notably for purposes of this article, (3) 
established a private right of action for buyers and sellers of securities against 
culpable inside traders if they traded “contemporaneously” with such inside 
traders.139  Accordingly, under this rationale, misappropriation of material 
dollars for his employer while acting as its agent, or, alternatively, that director had personally 
obtained money indirectly from structuring and marketing fraudulent collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs)). 
 135.  See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text. 
 136.  See H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27-28 (1988) (“Despite the absence of explicit 
statutory language for private rights of action outside of the contemporaneous trader plaintiff 
situation, the Committee recognized that there clearly are injuries caused by insider trading 
to others beyond contemporaneous traders. In the view of the Committee, Section 10(b), Rule 
10b-5, and other relevant provisions of the Exchange Act have sufficient flexibility to 
recognize and protect any person defrauded or harmed by a violation of any provision of this 
title or the rules or regulations thereunder by another person’s purchasing or selling a security 
while in the possession of material, nonpublic information, or communicating such 
information to others.”). 
 137.  Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.  100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78t-1, §78u-1). 
 138.  15 U.S.C. §78u-1(a)(3) imposed on a person controlling the violator a penalty of the 
greater of $1,000,000 or three times the profit gained or loss avoided.  For further discussion, 
see STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, at § 6.3. 
 139.  15 U.S.C. §78t-1 (a).  This legislation overturned the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Moss v. Morgan Stanley holding that contemporaneous traders did not have a private right of 
action under Section 10(b).  719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).  The court reasoned that the culpable 
misappropriator did not breach a duty owed to such traders. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, supra
note 135, at 26-27.  The term “contemporaneous” has caused a fair amount of controversy.  
See, e.g., In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Secs., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 
25, 47 (D.D.C. Jul. 31, 2007) (citing cases in which the respective court required the plaintiffs’ 
trades to occur within the same day as the insider trading transaction); but see In re Cell 
Therapeutics, Inc. Class Action Litig., No. 2:10-cv-00414-MJP, 2011 WL 444676, at *9 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2011) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has not defined “contemporaneous,” 
however “two business days is sufficiently close in time to satisfy the term.”). 
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nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of 
the information indirectly operates as a deceit or fraud upon 
contemporaneous traders, including purchasers who sell their securities 
“contemporaneously” with an inside tipper or his tippee.140  Hence, an inside 
trader or his tippee in the “bad news” misappropriation context141
“victimizes” contemporaneous purchasers within the meaning of Section 
17(a)(3).142
C. The Effect of the Proposed Amendment 
In Aaron, the Supreme Court held that, in order to prove a violation of 
Section 17(a)(3), the SEC is only required to prove that the defendant was 
negligent.143  Invoking Section 17(a)(3), the focus is on the fraudulent effect 
of the defendant’s conduct on purchasers of the subject securities.144
Nonetheless, under the current version of Section 17(a)(3), there remains a 
class of defendants that escape liability for negligent insider trading — those 
persons who, acting with negligence, purchase the subject securities or 
engage in tipping in regard thereto. 
 140.  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, supra note 135, at 25-28; 134 CONG. REV. S17, 219 
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heinz) (stating that “this legislation provides those 
who have been harmed by insider trading [namely, contemporaneous traders] with an express 
private right of action . . .”). 
 141.  See 134 CONG. REC. S17, 220 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Garn) 
(stating that private investors should have a right to recover when they have been victimized 
by insider trading violations based on the misappropriation theory). 
 142.  See supra notes 135-36.  Notably, the House Report “recognized that there clearly 
are injuries caused by insider trading to others beyond contemporaneous traders.”  H.R. REP.
NO. 100-910, supra note 135, at 27.  The Report thereafter provided the following example: 
The most prominent example of the non-contemporaneous trader suit which came 
to the attention of the Committee involved a suit filed by Anheuser-Busch 
Companies, Inc. against Paul Thayer, a former director of the corporation. . . . In 
that case, the plaintiff alleged that it was defrauded not as a result of trading with 
the defendant, but by having information secretly stolen and by having the 
subsequent trading on the information concealed.  According to the complaint in 
this case, prior to public dissemination, the tipper disclosed to several parties the 
plans of Anheuser-Busch to acquire Campbell Taggart, Inc.  The alleged 
misappropriation of Anheuser-Busch’s confidential information proximately 
caused a significant increase in the market price of Campbell Taggart stock before 
Anheuser-Busch announced its offer.  This forced Anheuser-Busch to raise its 
tender offer price, and the company eventually paid approximately $80 million 
more as a result of the illegal insider trading.  Clearly, in such a case, the plaintiff 
corporation was a victim of the defendant’s misappropriation . . . . 
Id. at 28. 
 143.  446 U.S. at 701-02. 
 144.  Aaron, 446 U.S at 697. See generally In re Bolan, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2201. 
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Under the statute’s current scope, liability attaches solely to the 
defendant that engages in misconduct via an “offer or sale.”145  By replacing 
the phrase “offer or sale” in the text preceding all three clauses of Section 
17(a) with “purchase or sale” (as in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), Section 
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) will, in effect, be applicable to negligent misconduct, 
regardless of whether such misconduct was perpetrated by means of a 
purchase or a sale.  Also, in Section 17(a)(3), by replacing the words “the 
purchaser” with “any person” (as in Rule 10b-5(c)), that provision would 
extend to situations in which any actor, regardless of whether such person 
was a purchaser or seller, engaged in misconduct by means of either a 
purchase or sale, thus broadening Section 17(a)(3)’s current scope of 
liability.  This amended version of Section 17(a)(3) would broaden the 
statute’s scope of liability, with minimal alterations to its overall language. 
D. Insider Trading Cases Based on Negligence That the SEC May 
Have Successfully Pursued Under the Proposed Amendment of 
Section 17(a)(3) 
1. SEC v. Switzer 
In SEC v. Switzer, the SEC brought an insider trading suit against the 
University of Oklahoma football coach Barry Switzer alleging that Coach 
Switzer was liable under Rule 10b-5.146  The alleged insider trades that Coach 
Switzer transacted were a result of information that he overheard from an 
acquaintance who was an insider of the company whose stock Switzer 
purchased.147  However, the court held that neither Coach Switzer nor the 
insider-tipper were liable for insider trading because the tipper had not 
willfully breached a fiduciary duty for a personal benefit.148
The facts of SEC v. Switzer are as follows: Texas International 
Company (TIC) was a publicly-held company that explored and developed 
 145.  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
 146.  Switzer, 590 F.Supp. at 762.  Coach Switzer also was the coach of the last Dallas 
Cowboys team to win the Super Bowl – in 1996. 
 147.  Id.
 148.  Id. at 766.  In order to be held liable for negligent insider trading under the current 
version of Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and 
nonpublic information that operated as a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”  15 U.S.C. 
§78u-1(a)(3). In this scenario, Platt, the insider, provided the inadvertent tip that resulted in 
Coach Switzer’s purchase and subsequent profit. Switzer, 590 F.Supp. at 766. Therefore,
neither Platt nor Coach Switzer can be susceptible to liability under the current version of 
Section 17(a)(3) because the facts of this scenario did not result in a “fraud upon the 
purchaser.”
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oil and natural gas properties.149  Four days prior to the public announcement 
of a merger between TIC and Phoenix Resources Company (Phoenix), a 
majority-owned subsidiary which was also a publicly-traded company, 
Coach Switzer attended a track meet at the University of Oklahoma.150  Also 
attending the track meet was George Platt — the Chairman of the Board and 
the Chief Executive Officer of TIC who also served on the board of directors 
of Phoenix.151  During the track meet, Switzer overheard Platt talking to 
Platt’s wife about the forthcoming merger.152  In response to the information 
that he overheard, Switzer informed several other associates who collectively 
purchased shares of Phoenix stock and profited from the purchase.153
Thereafter, the SEC brought suit against Coach Switzer and Platt for insider 
trading violations under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.154  Specifically, the 
SEC alleged that Platt improperly tipped Coach Switzer (in breach of Platt’s 
fiduciary duty to Phoenix as an undisputed insider) and that Coach Switzer 
improperly purchased Phoenix stock.155  Applying the Supreme Court’s 
 149.  Id. at 759. 
 150.  Id. at 761. 
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id. at 762. 
 153.  Id. at 763. 
 154.  Id. at 764. 
 155.  Id. at 766.  In regard to Platt as tipper, Platt was an insider of both TIC and Phoenix, 
and, accordingly, had an affirmative duty to disclose or abstain.  Id.  However, the court held 
that, despite the fact that Coach Switzer profited from material nonpublic information that he 
received from Platt, Platt did not violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because Platt did not 
intentionally provide the information to Coach Switzer, nor did he personally benefit from the 
disclosure. Id.  In finding that Platt had not violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court 
referenced the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks by stating that “only when a disclosure is 
made for an ‘improper purpose’ will such a ‘tip’ constitute a breach of an insider’s duty. . . .”  
Id.  Further, the court stated “[i]n Dirks, the court held that a disclosure is made for an 
‘improper purpose’ when an insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure.” Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662).  Thus, since Platt did not intentionally 
disclose the material and nonpublic information to Coach Switzer regarding the merger 
between TIC and Phoenix and because he did not personally benefit from the disclosure, the 
court held that Platt was not liable for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Id.
In regard to Coach Switzer as a tippee, he was obviously not an insider of either TIC 
or Phoenix because he was not employed by either company, nor did he maintain any position 
of trust or confidence. Id. at 765.  In finding that Coach Switzer had not breached any 
derivative fiduciary duty owed to Phoenix’s shareholders derived from Platt’s fiduciary duty 
owed to Phoenix’s shareholders, and thus did not violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the 
court again referenced the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks by stating, “only when there has 
been a breach of an insider’s duty which the ‘tippee’ knew or should have known constituted 
such a breach will there be ‘tippee’ liability sufficient to constitute a violation of § 10(b) and 
Commission Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 766. 
Further, the court stated that “‘absent a breach by the insider [to his stockholders], 
there is no derivative breach [by the tippee].’” Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662).  Thus, 
since Platt (as the insider) did not intentionally breach a duty to the TIC and Phoenix 
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Dirks test, the court held that neither Coach Switzer nor Platt were liable for 
insider trading.156
Although the Switzer court may have properly applied the Dirks
standard by finding that neither party intentionally violated Section 10(b), 
the facts of this case, on their face, may suggest that the conduct of the parties 
merited the levying of sanctions under a theory of negligence.  Irrespective 
of the fact that there was a finding of no intentional wrongdoing, one party 
(Coach Switzer) was granted an unfair advantage to profit from material 
inside information that he received from a corporate insider when that insider 
acted negligently by communicating this sensitive information at a public 
track meet.157
By amending Section 17(a)(3), the SEC would have authority to pursue 
negligent insider trading causes of action against a defendant such as Platt.  
A negligent insider trading cause of action under the proposed version of 
Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the wherewithal to 
prosecute the prohibited act of insider trading against subject persons 
involved in that scenario who either “directly or indirectly” engaged in any 
practice that operated “as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”  Based on the 
circumstances of this situation, Platt negligently failed to take reasonable 
precautions to protect information that he “knew or reasonably should have 
known was material,” and as a direct result of Platt’s failure to take such 
precautions, Coach Switzer financially benefitted from confidential 
information that he knew came from a reliable inside source. 
stockholders, Coach Switzer (as tippee) could not have committed a derivative breach.  Id. at 
767.
 156.  Id. at 767. 
 157.  In contrast to prior lower court case law (see, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 
635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980)), the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks also established that 
a “loose-lipped” corporate insider such as Platt will not be held liable for insider trading if the 
insider discloses material nonpublic information regarding the company to whose 
stockholders the corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty if the insider did not intend for the 
disclosure of information to be a gift or to result in a personal benefit to the insider.  463 U.S. 
at 662 (1983).  However, despite this limitation of liability, it is only reasonable to suggest 
that a corporate insider (such as Platt) who talks loudly in a public place (such as a track meet) 
about information that is material and nonpublic regarding a sensitive and confidential 
corporate matter should be held liable, especially when such information is overheard and is 
the basis for the ensuing trades. 
 Note, moreover, that SEC Regulation FD, which is not part of the insider trading 
statutory regimen, generally prohibits selective disclosure. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 
243.100 (prohibiting selective disclosure) et seq.; Securities Exchange Release No. 43,154 
(2000) (commenting on the prohibition of selective disclosure); Marc I. Steinberg and Jason 
B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP L. 173 (2002) (discussing the prohibition of 
selective disclosure). 
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2. U.S. v. Conradt 
In U.S. v. Conradt, the government brought a criminal prosecution for 
insider trading against five defendants (four traders at Euro-Pacific and one 
of the trader’s roommates, an equities analyst) for allegedly trading based on 
material and nonpublic information regarding IBM Corp.’s $1.2 billion 
acquisition of software company SPSS Inc.158  The indictment alleged that 
the information originated from an associate at an outside law firm, Michael 
Dallas.159  Dallas had been working on the IBM deal and disseminated the 
inside information to Trent Martin, an equities analyst.160  After receiving the 
tip, Martin allegedly passed it along to his roommate, the defendant Thomas 
Conradt, who was one of the Euro-Pacific traders.161  Conradt subsequently 
tipped three other traders, all of whom allegedly traded on the information.162
As a result, the government relied on the misappropriation theory in its cause 
of action despite the fact that the government’s indictment contained no 
obvious allegations that the law firm associate who provided the inside 
information received any “objective, consequential” personal benefit 
representing the potential of a pecuniary gain in exchange for that 
disclosure.163
 158.  U.S. v. Conradt, No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2012). 
159. Indictment at 3, U.S. v. Conradt, No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 
28, 2012). 
160.  Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
 163. Id.  The further facts of United States. v. Conradt are: four of the five defendants 
entered guilty pleas.  No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 at *1.  The day after the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in Newman, (773 F.3d 438), the court scheduled a status conference to 
determine whether the Second Circuit’s ruling affected the guilty pleas of the four former 
traders and Martin who admitted to an insider trading scheme.  Id.  The court advised all of 
the parties that, in light of the Newman decision, the Court was inclined to vacate those guilty 
pleas as legally insufficient as a result of the Second Circuit’s “clarification of the personal 
benefit and tippee knowledge requirements of tipping liability for insider trading.”  Id. at *1-
*2.  Although the government recognized that Newman had stated that the tests for insider 
trading were the same under the classical and misappropriation theories, the government 
opposed undoing the defendants’ guilty pleas, arguing that any reference to the 
misappropriation theory in Newman was dicta and that prior Second Circuit decisions have 
held that the misappropriation theory does not require the tipper to receive any personal 
benefit to be liable for insider trading. Id.  After hearing from the parties during the hearing, 
Judge Carter indicated that he had serious doubts about whether there was a sufficient factual 
basis for the guilty pleas but agreed to the Government’s request to prepare briefing on the 
issue seeking to distinguish Conradt from Newman on the basis that the initial tipper in 
Conradt was not a corporate insider. Id. at *1. 
On January 12, 2015, the government filed a brief supporting the sufficiency of the 
defendants’ guilty pleas, arguing that the Second Circuit’s holding in Newman was limited to 
cases brought under the so-called “classical” theory of insider-trading liability — cases in 
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A negligent insider trading cause of action under the proposed amended 
Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the authority to impose 
which the tipper is a corporate insider, who owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders. See Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of the Sufficiency of the 
Defendants’ Guilty Pleas, Conradt, No. 12-CR-887 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015), ECF No. 153.  
Because the case at bar was brought under the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading, 
in which the tipper is a corporate outsider who misappropriates confidential information in 
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, the Government contended 
that Newman should not apply. Id. at 1. 
On January 22, 2015, the Court rejected the government’s invitation to limit the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Newman to classical insider-trading cases. Conradt, 2015 WL 
480419, at *2.  In doing so, the Court first noted that both Newman and an earlier Second 
Circuit decision, Obus, 693 F.3d 276, make clear that “the elements of tipping liability are the 
same, regardless of whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the 
‘misappropriation’ theory.”  Id. at *2 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 446).  The Court also 
noted that “even if Newman did not specifically resolve the issue” the “emphatic dicta” in 
Newman addressing the issue was part of a “meticulous and conscientious effort by the Second 
Circuit to clarify the state of insider-trading law” and should be given effect. Id.  Further, the 
Court indicated that it disagreed with the government’s position on the merits, as well as the 
government’s reliance on earlier Second Circuit case law — particularly U.S. v. Libera, 989 
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993) — finding that such case law is consistent with Newman’s holding 
and that “the relevant language from [Libera] . . . has itself been construed to be mere 
implication in dicta.”  Conradt, 2015 WL 480419, at *3 n.1.  As a result, the Court vacated 
the four defendants’ guilty pleas and noted that it will later address two other motions to 
dismiss on the basis of Newman. Id.
Shortly after that ruling, on January 28, 2015, the assistant U.S. Attorney wrote to 
the Court and requested permission to drop the charges against all five defendants, conceding 
that the recent Second Circuit opinion “substantially changed the law pertaining to insider 
trading.”  See Exhibit 5, Reply Affidavit of Samuel J. Lieberman in Support of Respondent 
Gregory T. Bolan, Jr.’s Motion for Summary Disposition, In the Matter of Gregory T. Bolan, 
Jr. and Joseph C. Ruggieri (SEC received Feb. 9, 2015).  At a hearing the following day, the 
assistant U.S. Attorney told the Court that, in light of the Newman Court’s “new, heightened 
standard” the government no longer had “the requisite evidence to establish one of the 
elements of the crime” (referring to the newly clarified personal benefit requirement).  He 
further stated that, if the Second Circuit’s decision should be reversed in the future, the 
government would consider charging all five defendants again (assuming that the statute of 
limitations has not run).  As a result, the Court granted the government’s request to dismiss 
the causes of action against all five defendants without prejudice. See Ed Beeson, Judge to 
Dismiss IBM Insider Trading Case at Feds Request, Law 360 (Jan. 29, 2015).  Significantly, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Salman, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016), subsequently rejected the Second 
Circuit’s rationale in Newman, thereby leaving open the possibility that these charges may be 
reinstituted by the government. 
Notably, prior to the criminal prosecution, the SEC instituted an enforcement action 
based on the misappropriation theory against these individuals. SEC v. Conradt, 947 
F.Supp.2d 406 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 4, 2013).  Handing down its ruling prior to the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Newman, the district court denied the motions to dismiss. Id.  Subsequently, a 
number of the defendants entered into settlements with the SEC and then sought to have these 
settlements vacated after Newman was decided. SEC v. Conradt, 309 F.R.D. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jul. 23, 2015).  The district court denied the motions. See id. (holding investors did not show 
the exceptional circumstances needed to support relief from consent judgments). 
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insider trading liability against any of the parties involved in this scenario 
that “negligently” engaged in “a fraud or deceit.”164  As alleged, Dallas, an 
attorney whose law firm was retained to help effectuate IBM’s contemplated 
acquisition of SPSS Inc., carelessly disclosed material and nonpublic 
information that he “knew or reasonably should have known was material,” 
in breach of the duty of trust and confidentiality he owed to the source of the 
information — IBM.165  The information that Dallas carelessly disclosed 
carried with it “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser or seller 
of a security (1) would consider the fact important in deciding whether to 
buy or sell the security or (2) would have viewed the total mix of information 
made available to be significantly altered by disclosure of the fact.”166  As a 
result, Conradt, Weishaus, and the traders gained possession of this material 
and nonpublic information, and subsequently tipped and/or traded based on 
this information.  Therefore, Conradt’s tip, and the subsequent trades by his 
tippees, resulted from material and nonpublic information that they gained 
(directly or indirectly) from Dallas, who breached a duty of confidentiality 
to IBM by divulging this confidential information.  Such misconduct would 
have subjected these individuals to SEC enforcement action under the 
proposed amended Section 17(a)(3).167
 164.  Important to the context of these circumstances is the relationship between Dallas 
and Martin.  Based on the SEC’s original complaint, Dallas and Martin “frequently shared 
both personal and professional confidences.”  Complaint at 6, SEC v. Conradt, 947 F.Supp.2d 
406 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 2012).  However, “each knew or reasonably should have known 
that the other expected such information to be maintained in confidence.”  Id.  Thus, similar 
to the application of the proposed amended Section 17(a)(3) to the facts of Switzer, the facts 
of U.S. v. Conradt should invoke liability for a negligent breach of duty of trust and 
confidentiality that Dallas owed to IBM.  A negligent insider trading cause of action under 
the yet-to-be-amended Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the authority to 
enforce the prohibited act of insider trading against the law firm associate.  Based on the 
circumstances of this situation, Dallas negligently failed to take reasonable precautions to 
protect information that he “knew or reasonably should have known was material.”  See Bank 
of America, supra note 118 (providing a discussion of the case). As a direct result of Dallas’s 
failure to take such precautions, Conradt, Weishaus, and others engaged in transactions that 
operated as a “fraud or deceit.”  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
165. Indictment at 3, U.S. v. Conradt, No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 
28, 2012). 
 166.  Longman, 197 F.3d at 683 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667 n. 27 
(concluding that “to constitute a violation of Rule 10b–5, there must be fraud”). 
 167.  In order to be held liable for negligent insider trading under the current version of 
Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and nonpublic 
information that resulted in a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).  In 
this scenario, Dallas and Conradt provided the inadvertent tips that resulted in the traders’ 
purchases and subsequent profits.  Therefore, Dallas, Conradt, Weishaus, and the traders 
cannot be susceptible to liability under the current version of Section 17(a)(3) because this 
conduct allegedly perpetrated fraud upon sellers. 
For Dallas, Conradt, Weishaus, and the traders to be held liable under the yet-to-be-
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3. In the Matter of Gregory T. Bolan, Jr. 
In the Bolan proceeding, the SEC settled administrative cease-and-
desist proceedings under various statutes, including Section 17(a)(3), against 
a research analyst at Wells Fargo.168  The SEC alleged that the defendant 
communicated notice of a stock’s rating downgrade to a trader (Ruggieri — 
a Wells Fargo senior trader), who proceeded to trade on the information 
before it was made public.169  Because Bolan did not act with scienter, he did 
not violate Section 10(b).170  He nonetheless allegedly violated Section 
17(a)(3) by breaching his duty to his employer when he “should have known 
that he was providing notice to Ruggieri . . . of material nonpublic 
information . . . .”171  The SEC ultimately settled with Bolan based on 
negligent insider trading under Section 17(a)(3).172  However, due to the 
provision’s limiting language, the settlement only regarded the insider tips 
that resulted in sales.173
Under the proposed version of Section 17(a)(3), the SEC would have 
had the authority to institute an enforcement action alleging negligent insider 
trading against Bolan that involved the subject purchases as well as sales.  
Based on the language of the yet-to-be-amended Section 17(a)(3), elements 
of a negligent insider trading cause of action are: (1) buying or selling (or the 
offer of) a security (2) in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of 
trust and confidence (3) that occurs as a result of (4) a negligent (5) failure 
to adequately disclose (6) material and nonpublic information (7) that the 
defendant knew or should have known was material (8) that (either directly 
amended Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and 
nonpublic information that resulted in a “fraud or deceit upon any person.”  By amending 
Section 17(a)(3), the SEC would be granted authority to pursue negligent insider trading 
causes of action against defendants, such as the ones in this case, who cannot be successfully 
prosecuted for insider trading under the current statute.  A negligent insider trading cause of 
action under the proposed version of Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the 
authority to enforce the prohibited act of insider trading against any of the parties involved in 
this scenario who either “directly or indirectly” engaged in any transaction or practice that 
operated “as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”
 168.  In re Bolan, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2201. 
 169.  Id. at *4 (The PRXL rating was downgraded by Bolan as a direct result of Bolan’s 
research).
 170.  Id.
 171.  Id. at *8. 
 172.  Id.
 173.  In order to be held liable for negligent insider trading under the current version of 
Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and nonpublic 
information that resulted in a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).  In 
this scenario, Bolan’s tips resulted in Ruggieri’s trades that were both purchases and sales.  
Therefore, both Bolan and Ruggieri were susceptible to liability under the current version of 
Section 17(a)(3) for Ruggieri’s sales. 
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or indirectly) results in a “fraud or deceit upon any person.” 
As alleged, Bolan, an analyst at Wells Fargo who was entrusted to keep 
research confidential until publicly disseminated, carelessly disclosed 
material and nonpublic information that he “reasonably should have known 
was material,” in breach of the duty of trust and confidentiality that he owed 
to Wells Fargo as an employee of the company.  As a result, Bolan’s tippee 
became privy to material and nonpublic information and subsequently traded 
while in possession of this information.  Therefore, Bolan’s tips and 
Ruggieri’s trades were a direct result of the material and nonpublic 
information that they gained.  Accordingly, both Bolan and his tippee would 
be subject to SEC enforcement action under the yet-to-be-amended Section 
17(a)(3).
CONCLUSION
Liability for negligent insider trading under Section 17(a)(3) should be 
an important objective in the federal regulation of insider trading.  
Throughout the history of insider trading litigation, liability has frequently 
hinged upon the crucial element of scienter.  Due to this required element, 
negligent actors engaging in purchases (or tipping in regard thereto) have 
avoided liability despite the fact that, as a result of their negligence, they 
gained an unfair advantage to reap profits to the detriment of investors who 
sold securities without being privy to such information.  With respect to 
insider purchases and tips, two classifications of insider trading liability are 
currently recognized: (1) a defendant did not commit insider trading; and (2) 
a defendant committed insider trading by acting with scienter.  These 
classifications are on opposite sides of the spectrum.  The proposed 
amendment to Section 17(a)(3) bridges this gap by providing the SEC with 
the authority to pursue negligent misconduct in both the purchase and sale 
contexts.
If the SEC had the ability to pursue claims of negligent insider trading 
under Section 17(a)(3), it only stands to reason that the SEC would gain an 
upper hand in its current “war” on insider trading.  The SEC would be able 
to pursue a higher number of insider trading cases with the less rigorous 
burden of proving negligence.  A likely effect of this newly-granted authority 
would be the enhancement of market integrity through elimination of the 
senseless mental culpability distinctions that currently reside in the void of 
insider trading liability. 
